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ABSTRACT
Vietnam and the More Flags Campaign, 1964-1965: 
The Search for American Allies 
In the Commonwealth
by
Becky L. Bruce
Dr. Joseph A. Fry, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of History 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
In April 1964, the United States initiated the More Flags campaign in an attempt to 
establish a western coalition force and diplomatic support system for the South 
Vietnamese government and for American intervention against the North. Three of the 
most heavily courted nations were the Commonwealth members of Australia, Great 
Britain, and Canada. This first in-depth study of this diplomatic effort and the 
comparative response of these Commonwealth nations provides insight into the U.S. 
efforts at coalition building, the essentially unilateralist and nationalist nature of U.S. 
foreign policy, and the varying U.S. relationships with these three important members of 
the western diplomatic alliance at this stage of the Cold War. It exposed America’s 
declining relationship with Britain and the shifting reliance of the middle powered 
Commonwealth members away from Britain toward the United States.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1
UNITED STATES SEARCH FOR MORE FLAGS 
In an April 23, 1964, press conference. President Lyndon B. Johnson said that he 
hoped the United States would see more flags in Vietnam in a united effort to stop the 
spread of communism in Asia/ This simple statement was a public acknowledgement of 
a new State Department policy that became increasingly important as the United States 
intensified its involvement in the war. The policy known as the more flags campaign was 
launched by the State Department in April 1964 and continued through July 1965 when 
America officially committed combat troops for an offensive war in Vietnam in the hope 
of bolstering support for the Saigon Government and increasing allied aid for American 
action against the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam.
Among the most important flags being courted were the Commonwealth countries 
Britain, Australia and Canada. These traditional allies had mixed responses to the 
conflict. Australia was greatly concerned with communist aggression in Southeast Asia 
and quickly became a vocal advocate of US intervention. Britain was heavily committed 
in Malaysia and the Middle East and felt that Vietnam was of little economic and 
strategic significance. London was fearful that Western action in mainland Southeast 
Asia would spark Soviet or Chinese intervention, which could lead to a larger conflict.
’ The Johnson Presidential Press Conferences, intro by Doris Keams Goodwin (2 vols; New York: Earl M. 
Coleman Enterprises, Inc., 1978), I, 102-105.
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2Canada was caught in the middle. As a member of the International Control Commission 
(ICC), established to oversee the implementation of the Geneva Agreement o f 1954, 
Canada could not commit to any military action.
Set on the uncertain stage of the Cold War, the United States believed it could neither 
afford to lose the political support of its Commonwealth allies nor risk military credibility 
by losing Vietnam to the Communists. The Johnson Administration began the more flags 
policy to address this problem by acquiring increased support for American actions in 
Vietnam. Much emphasis was placed on alliance building based on the idea of mutual 
security needs and geopolitical stability. However, while advocating a multilateral, 
mutual defense strategy for Southeast Asia, Johnson was actually practicing a unilateral, 
interventionist policy that placed US nationalist interests above international 
considerations. The President had little regard for international organizations such as the 
UN, for international agreements, such as the Geneva Agreement of 1954, when they did 
not serve US purposes, or for international cooperation that infringed on US objectives.^ 
This foreign policy approach reflected Washington’s indifference to mutuality of interests 
and helped precipitate the shifting alliances within the Commonwealth.
The results of the more flags campaign reflected the impact that the Vietnam War had 
on America’s relations with the Commonwealth members and on the Commonwealth 
relationship itself. Most of the historical literature on America’s relationship with the 
Commonwealth members has been written from a bi-lateral perspective, focusing on 
Australian and Canadian reliance on either Britain or the United States and British
 ^Joseph A. Fry, Dixie Looks Abroad: The South and U.S. Foreign Relations. 1789-1973 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2002), 222-23, 294-97.
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3dependence on American backing, but rarely looking at the Commonwealth as a whole 
and the war’s impact.
Historian Coral Bell contends that following World War II Australia found itself in a 
triangular relationship with Britain and the United States in which it was regarded as a 
minor power relying heavily on Britain and then America for security. Australia’s 
traditional, automatic and unconditional mutual defense alliance with Britain was 
destroyed when World War II cast British reliability in a major war into question. 
Australian security reliance began to waver between America and the Britain in the two 
decades following the war until the economic struggles and communist threat o f the 
1960s pushed Australia toward Washington. The final shift in Australian security 
alliances came during the more flags campaign when American stopped viewing 
Australia as a minor power and began to consider it a middle power ally.^
Similarly, Gregory Pemberton asserts that after 1945, because of Britain’s decline and 
the perceived Communist threat in Asia, successive Australian governments sought to 
align themselves with the United States in international policies. Washington was 
receptive because by the 1960s, the “need of the United States to conduct its policies 
within a multilateral framework was reciprocated by its allies need for security.” 
Australia’s involvement in Vietnam was the product of these mutual interests."*
Canada also experienced a shifting international position. John H. Thompson and 
Stephen J. Randal maintain that from the end of World War II through the 1950s, as 
Canada initiated an independent foreign policy from the Commonwealth, Washington
 ^Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Oxford University Press 
Ausbalia, 1988), 1-6.
Gregory Pemberton, All tbe Wav: Ausbalia’s Road to Vietnam (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987), xi-xiv.
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and Ottawa established many “bilateral institutions and mechanisms” based on 
“economic interest and shared assumptions about the nature of the world and their 
responsibilities within it.” By the 1960s, however, different approaches to economic, 
cultural and defense policies began to fragment the relationship. Canada began to seek “a 
global ‘third option’ that could increase its independence of the United States.”^
While agreeing that Canada wanted to increase its independence from the United 
States in the 1960s, Greg Donaghy asserts that Ottawa sought only political and military 
and not economic independence. Canada actually developed a policy o f “economic 
integration and political differentiation” toward Washington. The intent was to address 
its economic weaknesses by shifting from its traditional Commonwealth trading structure 
to a unilateral approach to the United States while still remaining politically independent 
of Washington by adopting “new military and diplomatic roles” that were “designed to 
reflect a unique perspective on international affairs.”^
Much has been written on Britain’s “special relationship” with the United States and 
London’s shifting reliance between America and Europe. Craig Wilson argues in his 
article “Rhetoric, Reality and Dissent: The Vietnam Policy of the British Labour 
Government, 1964-1970” that in refusing to commit troops to Vietnam while pursuing 
peace initiatives, the ultimate goal of Prime Minister Wilson was to preserve the special 
relationship. Ultimately, however, Wilson made no fundamental changes in the nature of
 ^John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies (Athens: 
The University o f Georgia Press, 2002), 6-7.
® Greg Donaghy, Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States 1963-1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2002), 1-6.
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5the alliance and the British government became a “captive supporter” of US policy 
decisions/
Chris Wrigley provides a directly contrary interpretation in his article “Now you see 
it, now you don’t: Harold Wilson and Labour’s foreign policy, 1964-1970.” Wrigley 
contends that Wilson’s decision to intervene in the peace process was solely an attempt to 
establish himself as a statesman. The Prime Minister’s actions were not a conscious 
assertion of independence from the “special relationship,” but rather the event proved to 
the Prime Minister and the British government that the United States had already begun 
to move away from the old alliance. It was not until after 1967 and the failure of Wilson’s 
mediation that the British Government recognized that it could not reestablish the long­
standing US-British ties.*
Brian White adds to the historiographical complexity by arguing that the party’s 
Vietnam policy was not a break with the United States but was in fact an attempt to 
regain the relationship that had already been lost in 1959. In his article, “The decline of 
British influence on East-West Relations,” White maintains that the real turning point in 
the demise of the “special relationship” came in the 1959 Camp David summit between 
President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev which established a legitimate protocol 
for direct negotiations between the superpowers, thus removing the need for the third 
party intermediary Great Britain. The Vietnam War offered an opportunity for Great 
Britain to reestablish its special relationship by reinserting London into détente
’ Craig Wilson, “Rhetoric, Reality, and Dissent: The Vietnam Policy of the British Labour Government, 
1964-1970.” The Social Science Journal Vol. 23, Num. 1, (1986), 17-31.
* Chris Wrigley, “Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Harold Wilson and Labour’s Foreign Policy 1964-70”, 
in The Wilson Government 1964-1970. ed. R Loopey & S. Fielding. (London: Printer Publishers, 1993), 
23-35.
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6diplomacy through mediating an end to the war. By accomplishing this, England hoped to 
regain its status as a Cold War arbitrator.^
All of these assessments are based in a bi-lateral approach to American relations 
with the United States and neglect the impact by and on the Commonwealth relationship. 
By using a multilateral approach to examine the American relations with the 
Commonwealth, the more flags campaign reveals a growing rift within the 
Commonwealth itself, and changing attitudes of each member toward its American ally. 
During the 1960s, there was a re-alignment among the Commonwealth members. As 
British disillusionment with the United States deepened, London moved its diplomatic 
position away from America toward the European community. Australia and Canada 
were ultimately forced to reassess the utility of the Commonwealth relationship and their 
economic and military reliance on the United Kingdom. Both began to see the United 
States as a far more reliable friend. At the same time, the United States faced a growing 
foreign policy crisis that forced Washington to shift its alliance structure to accommodate 
the changing international attitudes, especially those of Europe, toward America. Where 
traditionally the United States had relied on the United Kingdom as its main ally and had 
considered Australia and Canada only minor allies of the Commonwealth, during the 
Vietnam War the roles were reversed. Washington became frustrated with England’s lack 
of commitment and learned to appreciate the role of the middle powered countries.
Britain turned its focus toward the European community while Australia and Canada 
shifted their security reliance toward the United States. In the end, the more flags
 ^Brian White, “The Decline o f  the British Influence on East-West Relations,” in Britain. Détente and 
Changing East-West Relations (London: Routledge, 1992), 108-09.
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7campaign’s lack of success exposed the growing rift in the American-Commonwealth 
alliance and provides useful insight into the process of alliance building.
United States Background to Involvement
To understand why the United States found itself needing to solicit allied help, it is 
important to understand the events leading up to April 1964. Following the end of World 
War II, the United States faced both the threat of communist aggression and the dilemma 
of how to interact with the post-colonial areas of Asia and Africa. Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt had often hinted that he supported complete independence for old colonial 
possessions, but by 1949 the Truman administration had to face the very real threat that 
international communists could take advantage of the vulnerable governments and 
economies of the newly independent nations. In response, the Truman administration 
chose to support French reoccupation of colonial territories in Southeast Asia. The 
decision was made out of a fear that weakening and alienating the European allies was far 
more detrimental to world security than upsetting third world areas that played a far less 
significant role in the world capitalist economy. While the decision upset the people of 
these less-developed countries, most notably the Vietnamese, Washington believed 
supporting French reoccupation was the best alternative at the time.
Once the Soviets had successfully detonated their first atomic bomb and Mao Zedong 
and the Chinese Communists prevailed in the Chinese civil war in 1949, Washington 
turned to an almost zealous stance against communist expansion and began using its 
economic and military abilities to back virtually any non-communist area under threat.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8By the early 1950s the United States became committed to stopping the communist 
insurgency in Indochina. While unwilling to commit military support to Southeast Asia, 
Washington diplomatically and financially invested in French Indochina with the intent 
of reinforcing the pro-western French presence on the mainland for as long as possible.
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 again drew attention to East Asia and 
reinforced America’s fear of the communist threat to the newly de-colonized areas of the 
world. The United States began to search for ways to strengthen the west’s presence in 
these more vulnerable areas. It was decided that Japan was too great an asset to the 
western powers and too close to the communist threat to leave it in its vulnerable, post­
war condition. Japan was a major Asian industrial power; was strategically vital to trade 
routs in the Pacific, especially the Asian market; and from its location, could be used to 
threaten either the United States or the Soviet Union. The Joint Chiefs of Staff envisioned 
a re-militarized Japan that could be used by the Western alliance against the Soviet and 
Chinese threat. The State Department, under Secretary Dean Acheson, believed that 
economic recovery coupled with a series o f American military bases in Japan was the 
best solution. The United States decided that the only way to ensure a pro-western Japan 
would be to allow it to rebuild its economy and to militarily safeguard the island against 
the Soviet and Chinese threat.*®
The greatest resistance to this objective, however, came from America’s 
Commonwealth allies in the region. The memory of Japanese aggression in World War II 
was still fresh in the minds of Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. They 
disagreed with the leniency of Washington’s proposed treaty and strongly supported a
Michael Schaller, The American Occupation o f Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), 164-77.
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9
firmer, more restraining settlement. All three were still greatly concerned with their own 
security in the region and wanted assurances in the form of treaty agreements with the 
United States guaranteeing American protection and assistance in their own strategic 
objectives. As a result, Washington agreed to the Australian, New Zealand and United 
States treaty (ANZUS) in 1951 which provided for consultation between the signatories in 
the event of a threat to any member and declared that the parties would “act to meet the 
common danger in accordance with its constitutional process.”*' While ANZUS had no 
provisions for military planning and remained only a civilian consultative body, the 
agreement laid the foundation for Australia’s heavy reliance on American military 
support in its future external policies. This reliance left Australia obligated to the United 
States when it intervened against the communists in Vietnam.*^
The United States originally favored a single multi-national pact including Japan, the 
Philippines and possibly Indonesia along with Australia and New Zealand and excluding 
any military commitments on the Asian mainland. By offering security to all four, 
Washington would create an offshore, pro-western barrier défendable by air and sea 
power. Ultimately, the United States could not get all four to agree to enter into alliances 
with each other and instead chose to enter separate treaties with Japan and the 
Philippines.*^
The United States did not want Britain involved in the Southeast Asian treaty system 
because of British commitments to the Asian mainland in Hong Kong and Malaysia.
" Howard Jones, The Course o f American Diplomacy (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988), 521; Department o f  
State, “ANZUS Treaty,” American Foreign Policy 1950-1955. vol. I (Washington, D C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1957), 878-880.
Jones, Course o f American Diplomacy. 521.
Ibid.; Pemberton, Australia’s Road to Vietnam. 25.
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Washington feared that British commitment to the South Pacific region could lead 
America into an unwanted intervention on the Southeast Asian mainland.*"* Britain 
opposed ANZUS because of its exclusion from the strategic decision making involving 
two of its commonwealth members. The British feared the treaty could lead to a possible 
military altercation that would force the United Kingdom participation through its 
commonwealth ties.
On September 1, 1951, the ANZUS treaty was signed. Australia saw the treaty as 
proof of its “special relationship” with America and began to shift its strategic alignment 
more heavily toward the United States. For Washington, the treaty had far less 
significance. The United States was more concerned with creating a global alliance of 
which ANZUS was only a small and somewhat insignificant part. To the United States, 
ANZUS was more a political gesture to ensure a lenient treaty for Japan, which was far 
more important to Washington’s global plan. In the end, the treaty proved more important 
to America than anticipated. As US involvement in Vietnam increased and international 
opposition heightened, one of the few sources of encouragement came from the ANZUS 
members.*^
When, in early 1954, the French found themselves trapped at the battle of Dien Bien 
Phu and requested that Vietnamese peace negotiations become a priority at the upcoming 
Geneva convention, Washington scrambled to shore up allied support for future US 
action in the event that the French withdrew from Vietnam. President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower initiated discussions of a possible “united action” to save the French position. 
Many factors had to coincide before the United States could act. If France agreed to
Bell, A Study in Australian Foreign Policy. 48. 
Pemberton, Australia’s Road to Vietnam. 27-30.
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internationalize the conflict, the United States would commit to action when it had the 
full support of its allies. When approached about a united action, America’s allies, 
especially Great Britain, refused to act before the Geneva talks had been exhausted.
Based on the lack of enthusiastic support, Eisenhower tabled the idea of intervention until 
after the Geneva Conference and instead took the opportunity to strengthen the security 
treaty system with US Commonwealth allies in Southeast Asia.*®
The Manila Conference of September 8, 1954, proved the opportunity Washington 
needed to gain a multilateral security treaty for Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO) was created in Manila by the United States, Great Britain, 
France, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines, Pakistan and India. The 
signatories agreed to a mutual defense of “the general area of Southeast Asia” in the 
event of “aggression by means of armed attack” or if the territorial sovereignty of any 
state within the Treaty Area was threatened “in any way other than armed attack.” While 
the language was strong, the treaty did not provide for military commitment and only 
required each signatory to respond to aggression in “accordance with its constitutional 
process.” The treaty was the culmination of America’s desire to contain Chinese 
communist aggression by creating an island-chain barrier of pro-western allies off 
Southeast Asia. It proposed to build a strong coalition by assisting member countries with 
military development, increased economic stability, and strategic protection. The treaty 
established a counsel to consult on military matters as they arose. Most importantly, with 
this treaty the United States finally had a multilateral security alliance that would
Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 40-51. For 
Eisenhower’s account o f Dien Bien Phu and united action see, Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Eisenhower 
Diaries, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1981), 274-84.
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ostensibly ensure allied assistance in the event that Washington found itself in conflict 
with the communists in Southeast Asia.
The ANZUS and SEATO treaties provided the technical rationale which future US 
administrations cited as they became mired in Vietnam without an official declaration of 
war. By ratifying both treaties, Congress effectively agreed that in the event of 
“aggression by armed attack in the Treaty Area,” the United States would “act to meet the 
common danger.”*^  Congress did not readily give up its constitutional right to declare 
war, but reluctantly agreed after being assured by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
that the wording of the SEATO treaty was used with the understanding that the President 
would come to Congress in case of a threat of danger “unless the emergency were so 
great that prompt action were necessary to save a vital interest of the United States.”**
This new treaty system had several effects on Washington’s Southeast Asian policy. 
First, the ANZUS treaty created an open relationship with Australia by giving them a 
voice in policy planning in Southeast Asia. This new dialogue would allow Australia to 
urge the United States toward greater involvement in the region and would enable the 
Untied States to pressure Australia toward troop commitment a decade later. Second, the 
SEATO Treaty created a multi-lateral security agreement that would be used by 
Washington hawks to claim an obligatory involvement in South Vietnam and would lead 
Johnson’s staff to a deluded belief that its allies would also assume that obligation and 
agree to assist America in the Vietnam conflict.
Department o f State, “ANZUS Treaty,” American Foreign Policy 1950-1955. vol. I (Washington, D C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 878-80.
Department o f State, “Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,” Jan 25, 1955, American 
Foreign Policy 1950-1955. vol. I (Washington, D C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 941.
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In July 1954 France began its exit from Vietnam by signing the Geneva Accords. 
Vietnam was partitioned and South Vietnam, led by Ngo Dinh Diem, began transitioning 
its economic and military reliance away from France toward the United States. With 
Washington’s assistance South Vietnam refused to hold the proposed election in 1956 to 
reunify the country and Diem began a seven-year campaign of repression in an attempt to 
solidify his control of South Vietnam. For the remainder of the 1950s, the United States 
assisted Diem financially and with military advisors to stabilize his control and to resist 
internal opposition from the emerging National Liberation Front and its allies in 
Communist North Vietnam who pursued reunification with the South.
During this time, Britain and Australia’s attentions turned toward Malaysia and 
communist insurgents in Indonesia. Washington encouraged British protection of the 
areas but refused any assistance to Malaysia. The United States felt it was Britain’s 
responsibility and of little significance to its own strategy. For Britain, the Vietnam issue 
had heen settled at Geneva and Malaysia was now the only obstacle to the United 
Kingdom ending all its commitments East of the Suez. For Australia, Malaysia was the 
only thing keeping London involved in Southeast Asia and a communist victory in 
Vietnam, would leave nothing standing between Australia and Communist China.
While Britain and Australia were concerned with Malaysia, Canada began its almost 
twenty-year entanglement in Vietnam. Under the 1954 Geneva Accords, Canada was 
appointed a member of the International Control Commission (ICC). The Commission 
was charged with supervising the application of the agreement. ICC members were to 
oversee the French evacuation from the North and the Viet Minh withdrawal from South 
Vietnam hy October 20, 1954, and to ensure the free movement of the civilians who
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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wished to evacuate across the Demilitarized Zone at the 17**^ parallel. The Commission 
would ensure that civilians and military personnel from both sides were allowed to move 
without restriction or violence. Finally, when disputes occurred, the ICC was directed to 
investigate the problem and make recommendations for a solution. For the remainder o f 
the 1950s, Canada was entangled in this often-ineffectual Commission.'®
In contrast to Canadian peacekeeping efforts in Vietnam, Washington began a policy 
of increasing support to Saigon through military advisors and equipment to the South 
Vietnamese Army (ARVN) so that by 1963, the United States had 16,000 “advisory” 
personnel in South Vietnam. The Kennedy administration was primarily responsible for 
the increase in American personnel and was indirectly responsible for the coup that led to 
Diem’s assassination in November 1963. Following the coup, a series of new leaders 
attempted to govern South Vietnam and to save the country from the National Liberation 
Front Viet Cong- a guerrilla insurgency group originally formed to challenge South 
Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and who were later supported by the North 
Vietnamese Communists. By November 22, 1963, when President John F. Kennedy was 
assassinated and Vice President Lyndon Johnson took the oath to become President, the 
United States was heavily invested in South Vietnam, the Saigon Government was in 
complete disarray, and the international community was begirming to question American 
objectives in Vietnam.^®
Paul Bridle, Behind the Headlines: Canada and the International Commission in Indochina. 1954-1972 
(Toronto: Canadian Institute o f International Affairs, 1973), 1-7; Edelgard Mahant and Graeme S. Mount, 
Invisible and Inaudible in Washington: American Policies Toward Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 
40-2.
Brain VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation o f the Vietnam War (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 4-10.
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Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam
Just two days after Lyndon Johnson became President, he met with his top advisors as 
well as US Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge and Central Intelligence 
Director John McCone for an assessment of the situation in Vietnam. Lodge reported that 
since the coup removed Diem, the situation in Saigon had improved and he believed that 
new leader Duong Van Minh would “speed up their war efforts.” McCone’s assessment 
was more critical of the new Saigon Government. He informed the President o f an 
increase in Viet Cong activity since the coup and said that the military leaders under 
Minh were disorganized and were having difficulties with civilian leaders. Johnson 
decided Washington “had to help the new government get on its feet and perform 
effectively.” '^
Johnson then heard a briefing on the Honolulu meeting of Kennedy’s top advisors, 
including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and 
National Security Adviser MacGeorge Bundy, held days earlier. The discussion was a 
“modestly encouraging assessment of prospects in Vietnam.” The participants in the 
Honolulu meeting emphasized that it was important to have “a unified [international] 
team and that there be the fullest consultation among them.” This was the first mention of 
what would become the more flags campaign the following summer.
Starting with the President’s November 26, 1963, decisions to continue with the 
Kennedy administration’s Vietnam policies, Johnson firmly set America on a course of 
an ever-increasing commitment into a seemingly endless and un-winnable struggle.
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During the first half of 1964, Johnson was hesitant to use American force in Vietnam and 
instead chose to increase support for the successive regimes in Saigon and to enlarge the 
South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). This hesitation stemmed from the fact that Johnson 
knew that any combat commitment would be unpopular. Over the next year, Johnson 
hoped to secure congressional approval of his Great Society program and then to get re­
elected in the fall. An unpopular war in which the United States had no allies would 
threaten those plans. The President knew he needed both to bolster international support 
and to devise a strong rationale for action in Vietnam before committing troops. The 
problem was most of America’s traditional allies, with the exception of Australia, were 
openly opposed to a widening of the conflict and without a strong, stable government in 
Saigon, the prospect of changing any minds seemed grim.
On January 30, 1964, Duong Van Minh was overthrown and the United States was 
forced to back yet another government under Major General Nguyen Khanh. Henry 
Cabot Lodge was once again optimistic, believing the new leadership was capable o f 
turning South Vietnam around. The coup left others in Washington more skeptical of 
South Vietnamese viability. The Joint Chiefs wanted to increase the U.S. military 
presence in Vietnam and to start cross-border operations in Cambodia. Others, such as 
Senator Mike Mansfield, journalist Walter Lippmann, and Senator Wayne Morse were 
pushing for negotiations and United Nations assistance. Johnson held fast to his policy 
of support for Saigon because he “thought they needed and deserved understanding and 
patience.” "^*
^ William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford: Stanford University 
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By March, the President’s patience was ebbing so he decided to send US Ambassador 
to South Vietnam Maxwell Taylor and Secretary of Defense McNamara to Vietnam to 
evaluate the situation. The resulting McNamara-Taylor Report described the deteriorating 
situation but rejected the idea of withdrawal. It recommended strengthening the Republic 
of South Vietnam (RVN) without sending US combat troops which might trouble 
America’s allies. Johnson agreed that the United States should support South Vietnam 
and develop a strong military and political base for possible future action.^®
President Johnson was in a precarious position regarding Vietnam. By April 1964, the 
Saigon Government had experienced three coups, the South Vietnamese military was 
performing badly at best and the North Vietnamese had steadily increased their 
infiltration of the south at a very efficient rate. In most situations, these negative aspects, 
coupled with the lack of any readily apparent economic or strategic significance of South 
Vietnam to the United States would have turned an administration away, but in the 
setting of the cold war and the fear of being accused of losing another China, Johnson did 
not believe he could walk away from the problem.
Added to the internal Vietnamese problems was the increased questioning of 
American Vietnam policy by key members of the Congress. Among the most prominent 
critics was Senator Wayne Morse, who in the spring of 1964 filled over two hundred 
pages of the Congressional Record with speeches critical of the Vietnam conflict. At the 
same time, conservative members of Congress were criticizing the Johnson 
administration for not prosecuting the war more vigorously.^®
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Johnson invited congressional leaders to the 526th meeting of the National Security 
Council on April 3,1964, to brief them on the current situation in Vietnam. Secretary of 
Defense McNamara summarized policy alternatives which included the possibility of 
“broadening the military campaign by taking the war to other areas, such as the North,” 
and the possibility of increasing the present program of assistance. The administration 
chose the later.^^
The Senators had several concerns with the proposed course. Senator Leverett 
Saltonstall asked if  any US soldiers would be fighting or whether they would remain 
advisory. Secretary McNamara assured him that they would remain only advisory. Senate 
Minority Leader Everett Dirksen then asked about the viability of using SEATO but was 
told by Senate Majority leader Mike Mansfield that it was only a “paper tiger.” Mansfield 
questioned the accuracy of the press reports from Saigon and the conditions o f the current 
government but was informed by McNamara that the real situation was “quite different 
from that appearing in the press.” Finally, Senator Flurbert Humphrey wanted an estimate 
on what this new enlarged policy would cost and whether the Vietnamese would execute 
the new program. McNamara responded that he “doubted that there was a problem” and 
then gave him an approximate estimate that the cost would exceed $50 million.^*
Senator Morse was also present at the meeting and disagreed with the entire South 
Vietnamese program. He asserted that Washington should have used SEATO and the UN
Summary Record o f the 526 Meeting o f the National Security Council, Washington, April 3, 1964, 
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to achieve a peaceful settlement. The President assured Morse that he would not have to 
be associated with any of the decision made by his administration toward Vietnam.^^
As it became more apparent that the increasing instability in Saigon was pushing 
America toward intervention without international support or domestic approval, on April 
22, 1964, Secretary Rusk recommended, “We need to get more flags flying in South 
Vietnam. We need to help persuade other countries to provide assistance to Vietnam, not 
only for the value of assistance, but also because of its importance to Vietnamese 
m o r a l e . T h e  next day, on April 23, President Johnson announced at a press conference 
that he hoped we would see more flags in Vietnam. The President and the State 
Department began the more flags campaign in the hope of bolstering diplomatic support 
for Saigon and increasing allied backing in the event of United States intervention. It was 
becoming evident that the United States would eventually have to step in and take a more 
active role in Vietnam. Many of Johnson’s advisors had been advocating such a step for 
months. It was also evident that the administration would face great criticism if  it did so.
Secretary of State Rusk initiated the new policy by sending a joint State-Defense 
Message to the Australian Embassy on May 7, 1964. He outlined the situation in 
Southeast Asia and encouraged a high level approach to the Australia Government on 
assistance to Vietnam. Rusk asserted that “the countries of Southeast and Southwest Asia 
are the first line of defense” for Australia and that an expanded effort of assistance to 
Southeast Asia would “provide concrete evidence of the Government of Australia’s 
sincere desire to maintain political integrity and independence of theses nations.” Rusk
Ibid.
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encouraged Canberra to increase support for Malaysia as well and thereby reduce the 
possibility of Malaysia turning to the United States for assistance. The Secretary urged 
Australia to offer more military assistance with the promise that it would result in a 
“broader US-Australian discussions.” Rusk’s vague language played on Canberra’s well- 
known desire to increase its level of influence on Washington policy decisions while not 
committing to any formal offer of exchange.^'
Two weeks later, it was decided that Rusk would make a trip to Vietnam to assess 
Saigon’s needs. Following his trip, the Secretary endorsed Johnson’s call for allied 
assistance. On May 18, 1964, in a State Department telegram. Rusk said he returned with 
the “conviction that it is important for more nations of the Free World to ‘show their 
flags’ in Vietnam.” Rusk inadvertently exposed the anxiety in Washington over the lack 
of support when he added “the nature and amount of the contribution being sought are 
not for the present as significant as the fact of their being made.”
Rusk’s telegram also revealed Washington’s misguided belief that its SEATO allies 
would come to America’s assistance. The Secretary cited a SEATO communiqué from 
the April SEATO meeting in Manila in which it was stated, “the Counsel agreed that the 
members of SEATO should remain prepared... to take further steps.. .in fulfilling their 
obligations under the treaty.” As would become evident over the next few years, not all 
of the SEATO members were as prepared to act as Washington hoped.
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While Washington was envisioning military support, the SEATO contributions that 
were given came mainly in token economic medical and advisory aid. Of the 
Commonwealth members, Australia alone offered combat personnel. Britain resisted any 
discussion of combat forces but did agree to send some counter-insurgency advisors. 
Canada refused any help on the grounds that their membership on the ICC precluded 
involvement but consented to conveying negotiation messages to Hanoi via its 
Commission membership. Canada was also contributing $1,500,000 to South Vietnam 
through the Colombo plan to fund technical assistance, food supplies and funding for the 
university of Hue, but Ottawa believed that any other assistance would jeopardize 
Canada’s role in the ICC.^ "* The United States elected to continue conversations with the 
Commonwealth and to assess the situation further.
By early June, President Johnson began to worry that the United States was moving 
too rapidly toward war. Johnson decided to use Canadian member of the ICC, J. Blair 
Seaborn, to convey his first peace overtures to North Vietnam. On June 18, 1964,
Seaborn was sent as an intermediary but not an advocate o f the United States. He served 
as a candid, neutral intermediary. The United States requested that Ho Chi Minh abide by 
the Geneva Accords by keeping his men and supplies out of the South and cutting 
assistance to the Viet Cong. Seaborn was also told to assure Ho Chi Minh that the United 
States had no intentions of over throwing the government of North Vietnam or 
maintaining bases in the South, but was willing to provide both sides with economic 
development assistance if  peace were accepted. Hanoi responded that the United States 
should withdraw and that a neutral regime should be set up in accordance with the
State Department Telegram July 7, 1964, NSF, COF: Vietnam, box 6, Folder 2, LBJL.
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National Liberation Front’s (NLF) program in which the country would be reunited under 
a representative regime led by the NLF. Despite this unsuccessful mission, Seaborn was 
sent again in August with a similar proposal but received an even less open response.
Once again, it appeared that a combat commitment might be the only US alternative and 
America would have to gather a coalition soon or move forward alone.
By July 24, 1964, America’s frustration with her allies was becoming evident. Even 
though the United States had yet to commit officially to sending combat troops, the sense 
of urgency to do so was weighting heavily on Washington. In a circular telegram to 
various US embassies, most notably to London and Ottawa, the President expressed his 
urgent desire to gain assistance from third country sources. Through a personal plea to his 
ambassadors, Johnson assigned the task of gaining third country contributions and made 
clear that no other task “precedes this one in its urgency and its significance.” The 
President explained that he was “gravely disappointed by the inadequacy of the actions 
by our friends and allies” and regretted their failure to “recognize their share o f this 
responsibility.” The ambassadors were charged with reminding the governments of their 
responsibility as Free Nations to protect the freedom of others, and if  necessary, to 
remind those who owed their freedom to assistance from others that they shared an even 
larger burden. Johnson hoped to play on the conscience of those nations, most notably 
Britain, which had received American help during World War II. The ambassadors were 
directed to exploit the close ties of America’s allies by emphasizing, “in the truest sense 
therefore the allied response to this request is the test of the merit of our alliance.
Johnson, Vantage Point. 67.
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The decision to commit to combat and the need for third country assistance in 
Vietnam became more immediate on August 2, 1964, when North Vietnamese patrol 
boats in the Gulf of Tonkin reportedly attacked the US Destroyer Ma JJox. Two days 
later the C. Turner Joy also reported being under attack. Despite the questionable validity 
of the second report and the suspicious location of the Maddox when the first attack 
occurred. President Johnson ordered air strikes against North Vietnamese torpedo boat 
bases and oil storage facilities. Then on August 7, Johnson asked and received from 
Congress the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution granting him authority to take all necessary 
measures to defend US forces in Southeast Asia. Johnson’s response to the incident was 
well received by the majority of Congress and the American public and effectively 
removed the Vietnam issue from the upcoming presidential election against Republican 
candidate Barry Goldwater. The only things standing in the way of a full US commitment 
in Vietnam was Johnson’s worry of war costs affecting his Great Society and the fact that 
the United States still had not secured allied support for the campaign.
Some members of the administration were optimistic that the Tonkin incident would 
improve the prospects of the more flags campaign. On August 6, the State Department 
received a telegram from the English Prime Minister expressing Britain’s support for “the 
action taken by the U.S. Government in accordance with the inherent right of self- 
defense.” The Prime Minister did not, however, offer any military support for future 
actions. He agreed only to help reduce the international tension caused by the attacks.
For the remainder of 1964, President Johnson and his advisors considered their 
options. The military wanted to extend the air attacks against North Vietnam.
State Department Telegram from Embassy London to Washington, August 6, 1964, NSF, COF: Europe, 
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Ambassador Taylor argued to hold off on attacks because Saigon was too vulnerable to 
risk upsetting the North Vietnamese and their allies. Johnson’s senior advisors advocated 
a two-phase plan consisting of limited bombing raids against infiltration routes in Laos 
and North Vietnam leading into a second phase of a large-scale air offensive against the 
North. On December 1, 1964, Johnson approved the phase one bombing operations 
against the infiltration lines in Laos but not against North Vietnam. These strikes proved 
disagreeable to some of America’s allies and hindered overtures to those allies for 
assistance in South Vietnam. Other allies, such as Australia and Britain, found 
Washington’s response appropriate.^^
With this increased threat and looming escalation of bombing, Washington once 
again looked for allied support. By December, it was ever more apparent that the more 
flags campaign was failing. In a memo to the President on December 11, 1964, National 
Security Council Staff Member Michael Forrestal outlined the status of third-country 
assistance. He focused on six countries he deemed the “best bet for significant additional 
help.” Among those six were Australia and New Zealand. Australia had at that date 
supplied 167 personnel of whom 80 percent were combat advisors, six aircraft with crew, 
an eight-man surgical team, and a variety of materiel. Forrestal believed that, despite its 
prior commitment to Malaysia and its previous loss of two combat advisors in Vietnam, 
that Australia “can be persuaded to make a significant increase in her contribution to 
Vietnam.
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Forrestal was less optimistic about Britain and Canada. Britain had given economic 
contributions for education, road building equipment and fishing boats but had only 
agreed to send seven people for the British advisory mission. London maintained that its 
position as Co-Chair of the 1954 Geneva Conference precluded its military involvement. 
The United Kingdom was also heavily burdened in Malaysia without US support.
Forrestal argued that a “strong approach” by the President might produce a small amount 
of economic assistance, but concluded anything more was improbable.
Canada was even less likely to increase support. Through the Colombo Plan, Ottawa 
had already provided $1,500,000 in educational, medical and commodity assistance, but 
refused to move beyond the single person already in Vietnam, and as Forrestal observed, 
was considering withdrawing from the ICC because they were in “ a sour mood.”
Forrestal’s recommendation: “do not hit them again.”^^
Based on the assessment that Australia was the most likely source for additional 
support, Johnson decided to address Canberra. The President made a direct appeal to 
Prime Minister Menzies in a December 12, 1964, letter in which he emphasized the US 
need for third country assistance and that Australian support would be greatly 
appreciated. The Prime Minister responded on December 18, 1964, that, while Canberra 
could not meet all of the requested supplies and advisors, further contributions were 
“already in prospect” and the United States had Australia’s continued support.'*’
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United States Escalation 
On February 6, 1965, the U.S. Army advisers’ barracks and Army Helicopter base at 
Pleiku was attacked, killing nine Americans and injuring over one hundred. At the same 
time the Soviet Chairman Aleksei Kosygin was visiting Hanoi. That night the President 
gathered his advisors and several members of the Foreign Relations Committee to discuss 
America’s alternatives. The resulting decision was an air strike against four targets in 
North Vietnam. America’s Commonwealth allies responded according to their previous 
positions on the conflict. British Parliamentary discussions showed that most in England 
felt that the bombings would produce a dangerous political stalemate in which neither 
side would agree to a cease-fire on the others’ terms. It was believed that the best solution 
would be for the United States and Russia to break the stalemate with the “UK spurring 
them on.”'*^
On March 2, the Johnson administration instituted air strikes as a set policy of gradual 
and steady reprisal directed against North Vietnam. The air campaign was known as 
Rolling Thunder.'*^ The first American ground troops arrived on March 8, 1965, when 
two marine battalions were deployed to guard the air base at Danang. On March 17, 
General William Westmoreland, the US Commander in Vietnam, requested permission to 
land marines at Hue. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor agreed with the request and told 
President Johnson, “We will soon have to decide whether to try to get by with indigenous
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forces or to supplement them with Third Country troops, largely if not exclusively
British reaction to this new bombing strategy was mixed. Many in London felt that 
the bombing was going too far and that America needed to pull out. Others were reluctant 
to alienate Washington by criticizing the move and hoped that negotiations might ensue 
despite the increased level of violence. American Ambassador to London David Bruce 
reported on March 5 that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had met with him to 
discuss the new bombings. They affirmed that, “there is no question of the continuing 
loyal support o f the British Government for the US in South Vietnam.” They went on to 
contend that, “our tactical position and theirs would be much stronger if  [the United 
States] demonstrated initiative toward n eg o tia tio n s .T h ree  weeks later, London 
remained committed to its position. On March 25, 1965, the British Foreign Secretary 
stated, “Britain wholly supports American action in Vietnam... we do believe that in the 
military situation the United States... must strike at North Vietnam.” He went on to state, 
“but that does not remove the necessity of trying to seek every reasonable way of 
bringing the conflict to an end.”"*^
In late March, Viet Cong forces attacked the American Embassy in Saigon with 
explosives, killing two Americans and injuring several more including Deputy 
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson. Shortly after, on April 1 and 2, the President and his 
advisors including Ambassador Taylor met to formulate the next step for Vietnam. The
Johnson, Vantage Point. 138-39.
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President authorized the deployment of two more Marine battalions and one Marine air 
squadron and an additional 18,000 to 20,000- man support force. He also approved a 
change in the combat status of the Marines to a “more active role.” According to 
Johnson’s memoirs, this did not mean an unlimited combat role but rather approved 
aggressive patrolling and limited counterinsurgency operations near the Marine bases.
When these escalations proved unsuccessful, Johnson asked Secretary Rusk on April 
20 to organize a conference of Washington officials, and members of the Mission in 
Saigon and the Pacific Command in Honolulu to reassess the situation. The resulting 
report suggested the best possible outcome would be to increase military and 
psychological warfare to pressure the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and Viet 
Cong to accept a political solution. LBJ’s advisors estimated that it could take up to two 
years, recommended a buildup of an additional 33,500 American troops and suggested 
the South Vietnamese ask Australia and South Korea for additional soldiers. President 
Johnson approved portions of the Honolulu Conference’s recommended increase, 
agreeing to send the 173’^ '^ Airborne Brigade and the 3'^ *’ Marine Amphibious Brigade, thus 
increasing U.S. forces in Vietnam to over 50,000. These troops were allowed to patrol 
near bases in conjunction with South Vietnamese troops.
At this point, Washington had a clear idea that Australia was the only Commonwealth 
member willing to provide military assistance in Vietnam. In a meeting in Secretary of 
State Rusk’s office on April 13, Australian Ambassador Waller announced Canberra’s 
decision to supply one battalion for service in South Vietnam. Rusk was appreciative and
Johnson, Vantage Point. 140-41.
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told the ambassador “the battalion would be worth many times its numbers both on the 
ground and in terms of its effect on public opinion in the World and in the United 
States.”'*^  On April 29, Prime Minister Menzies publicly announced Canberra’s decision 
to deploy one infantry battalion to South Vietnam. His statement made it clear that 
Australia was acting at the request of Saigon and that the battalion would collaborate as 
necessary with the United States.
The British remained adamantly opposed to military involvement. By April even the 
President had resigned himself to the idea that the United Kingdom’s only role would be 
to aid in possible negotiations. Prime Minister Wilson provided a clear appraisal in his 
account of an April 15 meeting with Johnson: “apart from an occasional moment in future 
years when President Johnson revived the notion o f British military presence in Vietnam, 
these April talks set out a division of function.” Thereafter, the Americans would 
continue to fight in Vietnam and the British would continue initiating peace talks.
With the increased troop commitment and the continued bombing of the North, 
Washington experienced high levels of criticism at home and abroad. In his April 15 
meeting with British Prime Minister Wilson, Johnson indicated his willingness to 
reinitiate negotiations. Once again the Prime Minister urged the President to halt the 
bombing as a gesture of his sincerity. After obtaining Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff General Earle Wheeler’s opinion that a pause would not cause serious harm.
Memorandum o f Conversation o f visit Ambassador Waller with Rusk, State Department, April 13, 1965, 
NSF, COF: Australia, box 233 (1 of 2), doc. 91a, LBJL.
State Department telegram to American Embassy Canberra, April 28, 1965, NSF COF, Asia & Pacific, 
box 233 (1 of 2), doc. 12, LBJL.
Harold Wilson, A Personal Record: The Labour Government 1964-1970 (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1971), 96.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
Johnson agreed to an eight-day bombing pause on May 10 and on a peace overture to 
Hanoi. By May 18, the President had no response and therefore resumed the bombing.
For the next month, the United States continued its Rolling Thunder campaign and its 
patrolling with the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN).
It was not until June that President Johnson granted General Westmoreland, the 
authority to commit US troops to combat “independently of... the Vietnamese.” On June 
27, 1965, the first major ground combat operation by U.S. forces commenced when the 
173^ Airborne brigade went into combat north of Saigon.^^ With a small coalition 
consisting of a few Southeast Asian countries and only one Commonwealth member, the 
United States officially entered the ground war in Vietnam. Washington would continue 
to search for more flags with minimal results.
Johnson. Vantage Point. 141-43
”  Ibid., 141-43.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2
AUSTRALIA AND THE VIETNAM WAR 
While Washington was encountering opposition to its entry into the Vietnamese 
conflict from the majority of its allies, the United States received overt encouragement 
from the Australians. With the Japanese ease in occupying Southeast Asia during World 
War II that enabled them to threaten Australia from close proximity, Canberra became 
painfully aware that the island nation’s security was directly linked to the stability and 
security of the region. Australia did not have a large military or the budgetary ability to 
increase their military in the event of a crisis. Therefore, Australia’s post-war goal was to 
initiate military alliances with its neighbors and with stronger nations to ensure a pro- 
western military presence in the area at least until they could build their military 
sufficiently to ensure their own security.
One of Australia’s first and most important decisions was deciding which major 
power to court most aggressively. Traditionally, Australia had looked toward Britain, but 
given its new commitment to NATO and its financial constraints following World War II, 
Britain’s ability to provide strong and reliable protection in the Pacific region appeared 
doubtful. The United States was obviously more capable o f  providing a strong and 
forceful presence in the South Pacific, but Canberra was also aware that Washington 
intended to push for a treaty and a strong alliance with Japan.
31
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Security Alliance Building 
The outbreak of the Korean War again drew attention to the communist threat in the 
South Pacific. The United States decided that the only way to ensure a pro-western Japan 
would be to allow it to rebuild its economy and for the America military to safeguard the 
island against the Soviet and Chinese threat. With the memory of Japanese aggression in 
World War II still fresh, Australia disagreed with America’s leniency and strongly 
supported a firmer, more restraining treaty with Japan. In September 1950, knowing that 
the United States would have its way on the Japanese issue, Australian Minister of 
External Affairs Percy Spender sought a security alliance with Washington in exchange 
for Australia’s support for the Japanese treaty. ^  To facilitate Australia’s acquiescence on 
the Japanese issue, the United States agreed to a security alliance with Australia and New 
Zealand which would effectively become an extension of an already understood security 
promise by Washington to its South Pacific friends. While Australia, New Zealand, and 
the United States treaty (ANZUS) had no provisions for a military planning organization 
and remained only a civilian consultative body, the agreement laid the foundation for 
Australia’s heavy reliance on American military support in its future external policies.
This reliance left Australia obligated to the United States when it took on the struggle 
against the communists in Vietnam.
American courtship of Australian support for its Vietnam policy began before the 
United States was fully committed to the conflict itself. In 1953, prior to the 
commencement of the Geneva Conference, the Eisenhower administration began 
weighing its options if the French decided to withdraw from Vietnam. In an NSC meeting 
in March 1953, it was agreed that the United States would have to have allied support if it
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were to take over the French responsibility. Eisenhower and his advisors speculated that 
ANZUS could be expanded to gain allied help in any future Vietnamese conflict as long 
as the United States agreed to assure the primary military burden. The use of ANZUS 
was not pursued at this time, but the NSC meeting did result in a consensus that the 
United States should work to ensure a mutual defense system in Southeast Asia.^^ After 
the Geneva Accords were signed, America’s interest in Vietnam intensified. By 
September 1954, the United States began to look past the French and start easing them 
out. Washington feared another country in Asia falling to communism and explored all 
avenues to bolster Vietnam without direct US involvement.
Australia had even greater anxiety over the Geneva Agreement. Canberra was 
acutely aware of the geographical closeness of Communist China and did not want 
another communist regime even closer. In April 1964, Labour Party Leader Arthur 
Calwell told an audience at Darwin that communism was now 350 miles from Australia 
and was creeping further south. Australians were readily applying the Domino Theory, so 
popular in American rhetoric. Calwell criticized the Geneva Agreement as an attempt to 
save Europe by sacrificing Asia. Many in Canberra understood their strategic dependence 
on European allies and were frustrated with other Commonwealth countries for not 
sympathizing more with the security problems of Southeast Asia. County Party Minister 
H. L. Anthony evoked the images of the appeasement of Munich by comparing British 
attitude toward Communist China to policies of the 1930s.
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This worry led Canberra to work for more security in the region. Historian Peter 
Edwards asserts that Australia developed a goal of quadripartite planning. The objective 
was an agreement between Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain and the United States 
to share in defense planning for Southeast Asia, with an equal and ongoing dialogue 
among all the m em b ers.W h en  Washington proposed organizing SEATO, Australia 
saw its opportunity. Canberra readily signed the treaty knowing that membership could 
lead to a request for troop contributions if  the signatories agreed to any military action in 
the treaty region. The treaty did not automatically require such participation but did 
create an obligatory feeling in Australia to contribute in the event the United States 
decided to intervene in Vietnam. Signing SEATO would satisfy Washington’s desire to 
ensure future action against communist aggression in the region and offered Australia the 
three things it most wanted: a firm commitment by the United States to the security of 
Southeast Asia, a way to keep Britain involved in Malaysia, and a security arrangement 
in which Australia had an ostensibly equal partnership with other European and Western 
powers.
The Communist Threat in Southeast Asia 
In the decade following the Geneva Conference, Australia’s attention turned to 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Following the establishment of a provisional constitution and 
independence, Indonesia was riddled with factionalism. Between the 1950 declaration of 
independence and 1965 coup, which replaced President Achmed Sukarno, Indonesia was
Edwards, Crises and Commitments. 168.
Ibid., 153-54.
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consumed with factional struggles among the Army, the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI), and Sukarno. By late 1957, Sukarno had contained most of the opposition but still 
had to maintain the balance between the PKI and the army.
At the same time, the former British colony of Malaya posed another concern for 
Australia. Beginning in 1949, the Federation of Malaya, comprised of 35 percent Chinese 
population, began lighting a communist -led insurrection. After gaining independence in 
1957, Malaya continued to struggle against the communist minority and to face economic 
and security troubles. In 1961, in an attempt to relieve itself of its formal empire in 
Southeast Asia and to stabilize Malaya, the United Kingdom, along with Malayan Prime 
Minister Abdul Rahman Putra, proposed the formation of a Malaysian Federation which 
would include Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei. Indonesia 
President Sukarno opposed the formation because he believed Britain’s intention was not 
to grant independence but to control Malaysia as an economic satellite. Sukarno was a 
strong nationalist committed to eliminating all European colonialists from Southeast Asia 
through a policy he called Konfrontasi (Confrontation). Sukarno declared a 
“Confrontation” against Malaya in an attempt to stop the formation of the federation and 
to force England to abandon its Southeast Asian possessions. The resulting struggle led to 
major British involvement in Southeast Asia and pressure on the Australian Government 
to provide a battalion to support Britain in Malaya.
Australia also had to consider the ramification of British decline during the 1950s. 
Britain’s struggling, post-war economic capabilities left it overextended geopolitically.
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During the decade following Geneva, Britain reassessed its capabilities and determined to 
end its commitments to all places ‘East of Suez’ and to find ways to improve its 
economic situation by applying for membership in the European Economic Community 
(EEC). Britain and Australia turned to the United States for assistance in Malaysia and 
Indonesian, but Washington was unwilling to become embroiled with this newly de­
colonized area.^’ At a meeting with the British Prime Minister and the Australian 
Ambassador in February 1964, Secretary Rusk expressed the opinion that the United 
States could not publicly indicate displeasure with Sukarno’s action because it would 
“destroy our leverage with Sukarno and in no way contribute to a peaceful settlement.” 
Washington preferred to stay in constant contact with Sukarno, to “lay down the law” 
with him.^^ Thus, it was left to the Commonwealth partners to stabilize the region. This 
placed a great strain on Australian resources and worried Canberra that the absence of a 
committed and powerful pro-western ally in the region could leave Australia vulnerable.
By 1962, Canberra had begun reassessing its defense policy. Australia was 
geographically close to communist China and the turbulent regions of Vietnam, Malaysia 
and Indonesia. It had a small and already taxed military with nearly no extra personnel 
for use in its own defense. Canberra had historically denied defense planners budgetary 
increases and Australia’s allies were urging more assistance for Southeast Asian defense. 
The Australian Department of Defense determined that the best policy for Australian 
security would be a forward defense strategy. The plan involved containing the enemy 
forces as far from Australia as possible. The Defense Committee wanted to extend the
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nation’s “strategic interests to Southeast Asia as the center and closest part o f the allied 
defense line extending from Pakistan to Japan.” To do this required keeping Great Britain 
engaged in Malaysia and Indonesia. Because the United States was unwilling to consider 
military assistance to Indonesia, when Washington began to show concern for South 
Vietnam in October 1961, Canberra pushed American involvement there. Australia began 
a rapid build-up of the military to a level that could provide security in the event that 
Britain and the United States retreated from the area. Unfortunately, budgetary problems 
left such an escalation unlikely until 1970. Thus, Australia’s immediate goal remained 
keeping the two larger allies in the region until at least 1970.^^
By October 1961, Washington had received enough reports from South Vietnam to 
conclude that Saigon would need assistance from third country sources. The civil war in 
Laos was about to be resolved in Geneva and the United States believed that Vietnam 
was the next target for the communists. Discussion began in Washington to assist the 
South Vietnamese regime under Diem. Kennedy agreed to financial assistance and began 
sending advisory troops, but decided to hold off on any further commitment until a 
multilateral agreement through SEATO could be reached. On November 11, Rusk and 
McNamara recommended that for political reasons, “it would seem important to involve 
forces from other nations alongside the United States. Our position would be greatly 
strengthened if  the introduction of forces could be taken as a SEATO action.” '^* Their 
focus was on the Commonwealth members because they held the most diplomatic respect 
among the US public and domestic politicians. Australia was very receptive to the idea.
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After a series of negotiations, on December 19, 1961, Australia agreed to supply arms 
and ammunition and a small number of advisers. This marked the introduction of 
Australian military personnel into South Vietnam. While small in number- mainly 
because Australian forces were already committed to Malaysia which seemed more 
threatening to Australia at the time- the Americans took it as a much needed approval o f 
its commitment to sustaining South Vietnam. For Australia, their meager offer helped to 
sustain Washington’s interest in the region.
Over the next two years, the United States, with the help of allies such as Australia, 
provided economic and military advisory assistance to the Diem regime of Saigon. It was 
hoped that through military training and economic encouragement that the Diem regime 
could solidify its power, expel the communist controlled Viet Cong from the south, and 
build a strong enough military to stave off North Vietnamese Communist aggression.
Those hopes faded when it became evident to the American delegation in Saigon that the 
Diem regime would not implement much needed reforms and that public support for 
Diem had declined. When Diem was deposed and assassinated in a coup during the first 
week of November 1963, Washington and Canberra began rethinking their strategy.
Australia was shocked to learn of Diem’s fate. Many in Canberra believed that the 
military situation in Vietnam had improved and that the strategic hamlet operation was 
going reasonably well. Following the coup, Australia took its cue from Washington and 
chose to place its faith in the new Saigon Government. Mainly this was the result of 
Australia’s preoccupation with the new “Confrontation” in Malaysia. The Australian 
Cabinet knew that the situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating and that pressure for 
assistance would be coming. However, with its commitment to Malaysia, Australia chose
Pemberton, Australia’s Road to Vietnam. 145-49.
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to wait for an American decision before offering an increase in involvement. That 
decision did not come until April of 1964 when the Americans implemented its more 
flags campaign.
Australia’s Decision to Commit Troops 
Australia turned most of its attention to Indonesia in the first months of 1964.
However, when the various British and UN peace proposals for Vietnam were presented 
to the United States in the spring, Australia became alarmed. Canberra did not want the 
United States to negotiate its way out of Vietnam before Australia had enhanced its own 
military. With the United Kingdom pushing to resolve the Indonesian “Confrontation” 
and withdraw from Southeast Asia within six years, Canberra needed the insurance of a 
strong American presence in the area to maintain security. Australia pushed Washington 
to reject any negotiations until the war turned more in Saigon’s favor and South Vietnam 
could enter into negotiations from a position of strength. The Australians hoped this 
would keep the United States in Vietnam for several years.
In May 1964, the U. S. State Department issued another plea to Canberra for 
increased assistance as part of its more flags campaign. Reminding Australia of the 
importance of Southeast Asian security, the United States requested more economic and 
logistical aid to both Vietnam and Thailand. Combat forces were not mentioned, but a 
call for all other support was intended to enable the American forces to be “reoriented 
and concentrated in projects of a purely military nature.” ’^
^ Edwards, Crises and Commitments. 335-36.
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Australia continued to provide as much economic assistance as it could but was 
unable to supply many of the items that American desired. Canberra considered sending 
combat forces even though they were not requested and continued to give the United 
States public support and encouragement. Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident,
Australia fully endorsed Washington’s retaliatory bombing. Minister of the Department 
of External Affairs Paul Hasluck stated, “It is our hope that the restrained but determined 
actions of the United States will have a strong deterrent effect on the aggressor.” He also 
reiterated Canberra’s intent to assist in the defense of Southeast Asia against the 
Communists.^*
For the next few months, while Washington contemplated future limited bombing of 
North Vietnam, Johnson pushed to recharge the State Department’s effort to gain more 
flags. Following an assessment of the more flags campaign’s progress, the President 
increased the pressure on America’s more willing allies. On December 12, 1964, Johnson 
sent a letter to Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies requesting additional combat 
support for the actions that the United States planned to take. While official Washington 
was to maintain its current policy of backing the Saigon regime with economic and 
advisory assistance, Johnson and his staff were developing other options which included 
a possible increase in bombing o f North Vietnam and an introduction of American 
combat forces. The President was not ready to commit to this escalation but wanted to 
know what type of international support he could expect if he chose to e sca la te .T h e  
letter emphasized the need for Americans to “understand they are not alone in the defense 
of the freedom of a country which is geographically so far away,” and thanked the
Pemberton, Australia’s Road to Vietnam. 210-11. 
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Minister for the assistance Australia had provided thus far. Johnson continued, “I cannot 
exaggerate the importance of any enlarged efforts in Vietnam which you are able to 
make.” Johnson listed the contributions that America most needed from Australia, 
including 200 additional combat advisors, minesweepers, and non-military aid. The 
President ended with a personal overture to Menzies, asserting that he was aware o f the 
difficulty this request would create, but “1 would not make this request as an American 
President to an Australian Prime Minister if 1 were not sure both that the problem is 
urgent and that I am writing to a strong and determined friend.”’’’
Prime Minster Menzies responded on December 18, 1964, with a guarded but still 
favorable response. The Prime Minister explained that Australia was unable to send the 
200 requested combat advisors because they were needed in Australia to train its new 
conscripts. They were also lacking many of the requested vessels and the few they did 
possess were already engaged in other areas. Menzies assured the President that the non­
military requests were “already in prospect” and reiterated that Australia intended to 
“continue to support you and you can be assured of our wish to do whatever lies within 
our physical capacity.””
Following the exchange of letters between President Johnson and Prime Minister 
Menzies, the Office of External Affairs considered whether Australia should send a 
battalion to South Vietnam “in order to obtain some forward momentum in American 
policy formulation.” Some members feared that the commitment of combat forces
Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Menzies, December 12, 1964, NSF, Head o f State 
Correspondence, box 1, Australia-Menzies Correspondence folder, doc. 62. LBJL.
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could have negative consequences. Domestic opposition to Australian involvement in 
South Vietnam was growing and there were concerns among several Cabinet members 
that the instability of the Saigon Government would only lead to a protracted 
involvement. There were others who worried that the decision would tie Australian 
credibility and security to American action only to have Washington agree to the 
proposed negotiations before Saigon was in a position of strength. Other Cabinet 
members believed the best way for Australia to keep the United States from the 
negotiation table was to show support through troop involvement. Ultimately, it was 
decided to delay the decision until after the anticipated military staff talks with the United 
States but to confirm in the interim that Australia would give public support for increased 
bombing of North Vietnam.’^
When the military staff talks were postponed, Canberra urged Washington to meet 
with Australian officials in the interim. Washington agreed to meet in early February 
1965. Minister of Defense Shane Paltridge was sent to the meetings and instructed by 
Minister of External Affairs Hasluck to assure Washington that Australia’s goal was to 
“remove any hesitation on the part of the Americans and, within our limited resources, to 
go with them but not to rush out in front.” At this same time. Prime Minister Menzies and 
Prime Minister Wilson were attending Winston Churchill’s funeral and had hoped to talk 
with President Johnson about a possible four-power conference on joint action on 
Southeast Asia, including Indonesia and Vietnam. Johnson, however, chose not to attend
Memorandum of Conversation o f State Department and Ambassador Waller, NSF, COF: Australia, box 
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and Secretary Rusk avoided any serious sessions. Australia remained interested in 
holding military staff talks, but got no response.’'*
Instead, following Winston Churchill’s funeral, Australian Prime Minister Menzies 
and British Prime Minister Wilson met to discuss Vietnam. Wilson explained to Menzies 
the pressure he was under from the both the British public and members of his own party 
to oppose United States policy in Vietnam. He was being urged to reconvene the Geneva 
Conference to resolve the issue. Wilson assured Menzies that “the British would not 
make any proposal to refer the matter to Geneva unless and until the United States 
approved.”
Then on February 6, 1965, the Viet Cong launched a series of attacks on US military 
installations in South Vietnam. The United States responded with Operation Flaming 
Dart bombing campaign. Australian Minister Paul Hasluck endorsed US action and 
especially approved attacks on targets related to North Vietnamese infiltration of the 
South. By February 20, Washington agreed to the military staff talks with Australia to 
encourage Canberra to send much needed ground troops to help secure the northern 
regions of South Vietnam near DaNang.’  ^ William Bundy prepared a Checklist of 
Diplomatic Actions on February 9, 1965, that recommended that the United States have 
“full consultation” with Australia through the Embassy and proposed, “quiet joint 
planning.””
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While Australia officially endorsed the American bombing campaign, internally the 
Labor Government was conflicted. Some supported American involvement in South 
Vietnam to counter Communist China. Members such as Deputy Parliamentary 
Opposition Leader Gough Whitlam wanted to see US involvement increase until Saigon 
could go to the negotiation table with the advantage. Another group, led by Parliamentary 
Opposition Leader Arthur Calwell, was critical of an American escalation that could drag 
Australian troops into a commitment but was still willing to keep Australia’s prior 
promises to Washington. A third group readily endorsed American active involvement in 
the region, but thought that South Vietnam was the wrong place. Dr. J. F. Caims, the 
emerging leader of the left wing of the federal Parliamentary Labor Party, believed that 
the best prospects for peace would come with an American backed strategic line enforced 
by air and sea power and running from Australia through the Philippines to Alaska. He 
endorsed the policy of containment, but did not consider the struggle in Vietnam the 
result of outside aggression and therefore not the right place for the Western allies to 
expend their resources. The anxiety across the Australian domestic front over Vietnam 
obviously mirrored that of the other American allies, but the Australian Government 
maintained its official pro-American stance in the hope that the United States would 
sustain its commitment to the region.^*
Historian Peter Edwards has asserted, Australia and the United States were on parallel 
but not identical paths regarding Vietnam. Australia’s goal was to “reinforce the views of 
like-minded elements” in America but that in reality, Canberra had little more than 
“marginal influence on the course of United States policy.” He claims that the hawks of
Edwards, Crises and Commitments. 346-47.
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the American administration appreciated the public support that Australia was willing to 
give when America’s other allies declined, hut that Australian pressure had no real 
significance to Washington policy decisions. There were far greater forces driving 
America toward combat involvement in Vietnam, hut Canberra’s insistence in the 
vulnerability of Southeast Asia and Australian official’s application of the Domino 
Theory to the region, helped the hawks in Washington assert their position with more 
weight.
Throughout February and March 1965, there was another storm of peace proposals 
from both American allies and communist adversaries. Among the efforts was the British 
proposal to re-open the Geneva Conference. Australia remained adamantly opposed to 
negotiations while Saigon was in a vulnerable position. As Britain pushed the Americans 
harder toward negotiation, the Australians grew more disillusioned with their 
Commonwealth partner. It was indicative of the deteriorating relationship that Canberra 
learned of the British overture for negotiations from Washington rather than London. 
Australian Ambassador to Washington John Keith Waller and External Affairs Minster 
Paul Hasluck worried that Johnson would acquiesce and Australia would lose its 
influence in Washington. Australia launched a counter diplomatic initiative opposing 
negotiations. Australian High Commissioner in London, Sir Alexander Downer was 
directed to urge British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart not to pursue premature 
negotiations or to try to convince the United States to “surrender their freedom of military 
action.” Then in March, Australian Ambassador to the United Nations David Hay 
objected to Secretary General U Thant’s peace proposal and his insistence that Ho Chi
Edwards, Crises and Commitments. 349-50.
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Minh was a nationalist and not a communist and that the confrontation in Vietnam was 
civil war in which the United States should not be involved.
Prime Minister Menzies reaffirmed the Australian commitment in March when he 
responded to an anti-war, pro-negotiation letter from Anglican bishops in Australia. 
Menzies composed a letter that was sent to Washington and London as well as to the 
bishops in which he unmistakably showed Australia’s support for a “forceful United 
States policy.” Menzies accused the communists of repeatedly violating the Geneva 
Agreements through their “establishment and maintenance” of the Viet Cong who were 
“determined upon revolution by violence.” The letter praised the Americans for their 
“courageous and generous acceptance of responsibilities for the protection o f human 
freedom” and suggested that the United States should not negotiate with the Viet Cong as 
they had already proven they would disregard any agreement. While the Prime Minister 
did not suggest sending Australian troops, his strong language was meant to discourage 
President Johnson from seeking negotiations and to prepare the way for a possible 
commitment in the future.
Other members of the Menzies Government also spoke out against the negotiation 
proposals and hoped to discourage the Americans from withdrawing from Southeast 
Asia. On March 23, External Affairs Minster Paul Hasluck stated in Parliament that 
Vietnam was “not a local rebellion caused by internal discontent but the application of 
the methods and doctrines of Communist guerrilla warfare first evolved in China.” He
' Barclay, Politics o f Australian Involvement in Vietnam. 94-98. 
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warned that if Americans withdrew from South Vietnam, it would leave the way open for 
the Chinese to take Vietnam and then Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and “further.”*^
The delayed Military staff talks were finally held in Honolulu on March 30 and April 
1, 1965. In a preparatory hrief on March 25, Minister of Defense Pabridge directed the 
Australian delegation to secure detailed information on American plans for military 
operations and how the United States proposed to deal with the problem of “foreign 
troops operating on a civil war in which they will have great difficulty in distinguishing 
friend for foe.” The delegates were given vague answers to their inquiry. They were 
left with the impression that an enclave strategy, in which American forces would he 
deployed around major US bases with the authorization to conduct offensive operations 
within a fifty-mile radius of each base, would be implemented and that other countries 
might he asked to contribute. Australian Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed 
Services Frederick Scherger, head of the Australian delegation, “indicated that Australia 
would contribute forces to South Vietnam in response to any U.S. request.” On April 5,
US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Leonard Unger told Australian 
Ambassador to France Alan Renouf that the United States would deploy three more 
marine battalions for combat and that Australia should expect an official request for a 
battalion contribution and another 150 instructors to train the ARVN regional forces.
On April 7, 1965, the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (FAD) met and made 
the final decision on Australian commitment. The discussion reflected the wide range of
Edwards, Crises and Commitments, 356. 
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opinions running through Canberra. Chairman Scherger told the group that he had been 
given unconfirmed information that the United States was preparing an enclave strategy 
and that Washington hoped that Australia would provide at least one battalion. Hasluck 
wanted to delay until after President Johnson’s upcoming speech at Johns Hopkins 
University to better assess the real U.S. intension. He also feared that Australia was 
spread too thin in Southeast Asia and should assess the best place to deploy the one 
battalion available. Opposing Hasluck was Cabinet Minister Harold Holt. The future 
Prime Minister felt that Australia should give the largest contribution possible regardless 
of “the final outcome of the United States intervention in Vietnam.” Country Party 
Leader John McEwen, another future Prime Minister, agreed since Australia needed to do 
everything possible to encourage the Americans to stay in Vietnam. Prime Minister 
Menzies concurred, because Australian security would he in jeopardy if  South Vietnam 
fell to communism. He anticipated that the psychological effect of Australian aid on their 
American allies would be advantageous.
The debate also involved the level of commitment that Australia could afford.
Menzies warned that pledging a battalion to Vietnam would strain Australia’s 
responsibility to Indonesia. He also worried that deploying another 150 advisors would 
leave Australia unable to train its new conscripts. He wanted to remind both the United 
State and Britain that Australia would require assistance for the region if they were to 
pledge another battalion in Southeast Asia. Defense Minister Paltridge also preferred a 
clear explanation of the role and location of the battalion’s deployment before Australia
85 Edwards, Crises and Commitments. 361-62.
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agreed. Ultimately, the FAD Committee refused the request for an additional 150 
advisors but agreed to dispatch a battalion.
Once the decision was made, Australia needed the South Vietnamese Government to 
formally request the battalion. On April 22, 1965, the State Department notified the 
American and Australian ambassadors to Saigon that a formal request would be made to 
South Vietnamese Defense Minister Phan Huy Quat but that no private approaches 
should he initiated until a final approval was received. Washington approached the 
Saigon Government delicately because Quat was reluctant to approve additional troops 
until he was sure “additional forces were needed and because there is a question in his 
mind as to whether foreign troops are suitable for winkling out terrorists among the 14 
million people in South Viet-Nam.” ’^ Australia received its formal request after a few 
discussions between the general and the American and Australian ambassadors.
On April 29, 1965, Prime Minister Menzies officially announced in the House of 
Representative that Australia would send one battalion to South Vietnam in response to a 
request from the RVN government. In his speech he told the House, “the takeover of 
South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of 
South and Southeast Asia. It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China 
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.”^^
Australia’s decision to offer a battalion to the struggle in Vietnam was not undertaken 
lightly. For fifteen years prior to the April 29, 1965, announcement, Canberra had pushed
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the United States and Great Britain for a stronger presence in the region. The often 
relentless urging left little room for maneuvering out of a reciprocal offer when the 
Americans answered their pleas. Australia seemed more concerned with building a strong 
American-Australian security relationship in the region and with maintaining strong 
assurance by the United Kingdom than with the actual situation South Vietnam. Most 
fateful of all, no one in the Australia’s successive governments ever questioned 
America’s ability to win the conflict once committed. It was assumed that the US military 
juggernaut would stop the flow of communism. As Scherger himself said in retrospect,
“If one expected America to do anything on our behalf, then we had to do something to 
show willingness to assist. It never was conceivable to us that America would lose.”
Before Australia withdrew from the conflict, Canberra sent another two battalions and 
endured repercussions at home similar to those felt in Washington. At the height of its 
involvement in 1967, Australia had over 8,300 troops in Vietnam and lost 494 men.
After Prime Minster Harold Holt died in December 1967, the new Prime Minister John 
Gorton informed President Johnson that no more troop increases would come. By 1969, 
Canberra began a gradual process of withdrawal that would be completed in December 
1971*°
Like many other allies, Australians ultimately became disillusioned with the United 
States. Australia’s disappointment was unique in that political opinion was split between 
the left and right as represented by the left and right wings of the Democratic Labour 
Party. The Left wing was troubled with the initial engagement and commitment in
' Edwards, Crises and Commitments. 375.
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Vietnam and the validity of US involvement. The Right wing originally favored the war 
hut opposed US disengagement from South Vietnam without providing for a viable 
government in Saigon.^' Ultimately, the Australian security relationship with the United 
States was damaged but not permanently destroyed.
Assessing the decision to commit troops to Vietnam in terms of national security, 
Australia acted on the assumption that it could not provide adequate security for itself 
without outside, particularly United States, aid. Faced with a small standing military, a 
growing threat from China, and the fresh memories of Japanese aggression in World War 
II, the Australian Government placed great importance on the Domino Theory in both 
Vietnam and Indonesia. Australian officials, such as Minister of External Affairs Paul 
Hasluck, believed that American success in Vietnam was vital to Australian security.
Only when it became apparent that the United States would not succeed in the war did 
Australian opinion turn against America. In the end. South Vietnam fell to the 
communists, but the dominos fell no further. Australian security remained stable and 
unthreatened by North Vietnamese or Chinese communist aggression. Like the United 
States, Australia had misjudged the geopolitical dynamics in Southeast Asia.
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CHAPTER 3
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE VIETNAM WAR 
While the Vietnam War brought Australia closer to the United States, it forced a 
greater rift between Washington and the other Commonwealth members. Great Britain 
had been one of America’s closest and most useful allies, but by the time the Johnson 
administration took over, that partnership was becoming a source of great frustration. The 
more Washington pressed for troops and public support, the more London turned away.
The escalation of American combat involvement in Vietnam prompted Britain to 
break its connection with the United States. The Wilson Government refused to send any 
assistance or reinforcements to help the Americans even in the face of great pressure 
from President Lyndon B. Johnson and his staff. There were many factors that led to the 
decision and most were directly associated with Britain’s struggle to maintain domestic 
stability while reasserting its international influence. Domestically, the Wilson 
Government faced several problems throughout 1964 and 1965. First, there was great 
disagreement between the leftist members of the Labour Party and the members of the 
Office of Foreign Affairs over the government’s support for American actions. The 
Leftists strongly urged Wilson to disassociate the government from the United States, 
placing great pressure on the already weak intra-party coalition. Members such as A.
52
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Kitson and R. Wadsworth presented the Labour Party with several resolutions calling for 
condemnation of United States intervention in Vietnam/^
Britain’s desire to join the European Economic Community (EEC) also influenced 
Wilson’s thinking. Britain had applied for membership in the EEC in 1963 but had been 
denied entry on the grounds that it was too closely aligned with the United States. French 
President Charles de Gaulle had asserted that Britain would not put the interests of the 
European Union before that of America when a conflict arose and therefore should he 
excluded.^'* England needed to join the EEC to improve its economic viability and 
demonstrate its independence from the Untied States. Britain had relied heavily on the 
US backing of sterling to stabilize its economy. If England joined the European 
Community, it could rebuild its economy without such a reliance on the Americans. By 
disassociating itself from American policy on Vietnam, which the European community 
condemned, the British could rebut De Gaul’s claims of British dependency on the 
United States.^^
The Labour Government also had to address the public and parliamentary 
dissatisfaction with American policy in Vietnam. Incidents of public protests against the 
“immorality” of US actions in Vietnam- the increased bombing and the use of nerve gas 
by the South Vietnamese Government- were becoming more frequent, culminating in a 
teach-in at Oxford University in June 1965. These increasing demonstrations against 
American war policy posed a serious threat to the slim Labour majority that existed in
Labour Party, Report o f  the Sixty-Fifth Annual Conference o f  the Labour Party-1966. (Great Britain: 
Labour Party, 1964), 182.
“Britain and the United States” letter to the editor, The Times, in Anglo-American Relations Since 1939: 
the Enduring Alliance, ed. John Baylis (New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 161.
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Parliament in 1965. The Wilson Government had won the majority in 1964 by only four 
seats. Furthermore, opposition within the party itself, especially from the far left who 
disapproved of what they deemed U.S. imperialism in Vietnam threatened a possible 
fraeture in the Wilson administration’s eoalition. It was strategically important for Wilson 
to find a policy that soothed internal discontent and gained the trust of the European 
community while not severing all ties with its historically important ally, the United 
States.
Given these contradictory opinions and ongoing economic problems, the Wilson 
Government decided that the best policy to satisfy all sides would be to deny military 
assistance to the United States while continuing support though mediation and diplomatic 
intervention. This would allow Britain to remain sufficiently involved to keep the special 
relation in tact while not showing support for the highly unpopular military aspects of the 
confliet.^^ Still, even this political strategy carried problems. First, it assumed that both 
the United States and the Vietnamese countries were open to mediation. Second, it 
assumed that the Wilson government still had the influence neeessary to conduct the 
proeess. Third, it depended on the eorrectness of Wilson’s belief that the British publie 
would accept his rejection of military involvement as a sufficiently firm stance against 
the United States. The Prime Minister would discover that his government did not have 
the necessary influenee to bring all parties to the negotiating table and that his efforts 
would not quiet the growing diseontent with America’s Vietnam policy in Britain.
^  Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East o f  Suez: The Choice Between Europe and the World (New  
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 105-8.
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Britain’s Declining International 
Standing
Following World War II, Great Britain’s international influence as well as its 
economic power gradually deteriorated due to the instability of its sterling currency and 
failures of several foreign policy actions such as the Suez crisis of 1956. Assistance and 
support from the United States had traditionally been important to London’s ability to 
sustain its place in the international arena, hut as the British decline became more 
apparent, England was forced to forge its own path. By loosening the tie with the United 
States and moving toward a Eurocentric foreign policy, London sought to ensure a new 
place for Great Britain in international affairs. Applying for membership in the European 
Economic Community (EEC) was critical. Membership would open up new markets for 
the struggling English economy and enable London to forge a stronger security 
relationship with its European allies. Also, because of the economic struggles. Great 
Britain began to recognize the need to lighten its economic burdens by withdrawing from 
colonies in Africa and the Middle East. As debates over these issues lingered in 
Parliament, they sent a message to the international community of yet another sign of 
Britain’s slip from world power.
Several things stood in the way of re-aligning British foreign policy. The first was 
London’s pre-existing commitment to Malaysia. Beginning in 1949, the Federation of 
Malaya began fighting a communist -led insurrection by the Chinese immigrants who 
comprised about 35 percent of Malaya’s population. After gaining independence in 1957, 
the Federation of Malaya continued to struggle against the communist minority for 
another three decades.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
Meanwhile, Indonesia faced similar problems. The Indonesian national election of 
1955 produced no parliamentary party majority and forced President Achmed Sukarno to 
reform the party system and solidify more control within the presidency to create 
stability. In October 1956, Sukarno visited the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of 
China and returned with a new policy he called “guided democracy” in which he began to 
prohibit most political parties and suppress regional factions who posed a threat to the 
federal government. By March 1957, the last autonomous regional government collapsed 
and Sukarno declared martial law. Few political parties survived. One notable exception 
was the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) which in the July 1957 provincial elections 
on Java became the largest party. It seemed evident to the western allies that Sukarno was 
willing to use the PKI to solidify his own control. London worried that this left all o f 
Indonesia vulnerable to communist take-over.
Britain knew that its withdrawal from the area would leave Malaya even more 
vulnerable and could lead to Communist domination of region. It was decided to build up 
Malaya and the surrounding area to insure the countries could provide their own security. 
In 1961 the United Kingdom along with the Malaya Prime Minister Abdul Rahman Putra 
proposed the formation of a Malaysian Federation, which would include Malaya, 
Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei, and would create an economic and 
strategic power structure in the South Pacific. Indonesia President Sukarno opposed the 
federation. A conflict, termed the “Confrontation”, soon developed between Sukarno and 
the Malaysian and British military forces. Because Britain became involved in the 
“Confrontation”, Australia was also persuaded to contribute a battalion which drained its
^ Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia. 1961-1965: Britain, the United States and 
the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3-12.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
military budget and left its military forces over committed. This conflict consumed 
British forces into the late 1960s and became a source of bitterness between Washington 
and London. The Americans refused to assist the British with the Confrontation while 
pushing Britain for assistance in Vietnam. The British argued that if they were expected 
to carry the burden in Malaysia, the United States should do likewise in Vietnam.^^
Britain’s application to join the EEC also complicated its foreign policy re-alignment. 
In 1963 Great Britain applied for membership in the EEC. Its application was initially 
denied because of overly close British relations with the United States. Washington 
seemed to recognize the British need to lessen its reliance in the United States and to 
approve a policy that promised to strengthen the European economy and alleviate some 
of the burden for America. Ironically, this move worried the other Commonwealth 
members because it placed their preferred trading status with Britain in jeopardy.
British Response to More Flags 
By the time the Labour Party regained control of Parliament in 1964, Britain had lost 
international influence as well as experienced a deterioration in its the relationship with 
the United States. Prime Minister Harold Wilson faced the task of rebuilding the Labour 
majority while contending with public and official opposition to his policy of 
simultaneously defending American action in Vietnam and calling for negotiations.
Many backbenchers and left-wing members of the Labour Party pushed Wilson to 
disassociate the United Kingdom from all American actions and to condemn American 
escalation and bombing during the first half of 1965. Washington continued to pressure
99 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia.. 3-12.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
the Wilson Government to make a more visible military contribution.’ *^’ Wilson was 
dedicated to securing the “special relationship” while finding alternatives to fighting in 
the conflict. Ultimately, however, Wilson did not dictate poliey. He eventually responded 
to domestic pressures and declining international status and turned his back on the 
“special relationship” with the United States. He exerted British independence by 
refusing to publicly back the United States with troops for Vietnam.
When Washington began to solicit more flags, London’s shifting policy became 
glaringly clear. In response to his orders to press for more British aid on July 10, 1964, 
American Ambassador to Britain David Bruce discussed US needs with London. Bruce 
was told that the Britain should not have to contribute to Vietnam because of its role as 
Co-Chair of the 1954 Geneva Convention and because they were assuming an anti­
communist responsibility in Malaysia without U.S. support. Britain appeared willing to 
increase its police training force upon GVN request because this would not conflict with 
British responsibilities under the Geneva Conference. However, London emphasized that 
it was taking on the burden of Malaysia without Washington’s assistance and therefore 
London should not be required to support American action in Vietnam. Britain contended 
it had “exercised restraint in not requesting U.S. [to] show its flag in Malaysia” and that 
London, “would not regard resumption of US aid to Indonesia as proper quid pro quo for 
UK assistance to US effort in Vietnam.”’*”
By August 1964, Britain had provided a five-man advisory mission on 
counterinsurgency, a £56,000 grant for road building, and agreed to furnish additional
100 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East o f Suez. 105-E
Telegram from Ambassador Bruce to State Department, July 10, 1964, NSF, COF; Vietnam, box 6, 
Folder 2, doc. 30, LBJL.
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police training advisors. When pressed for further assistance, London reiterated its 
responsibility as Co-chair of the Geneva Conference and its considerable aid to Malaysia 
and Laos.’°^  Given the British response to US overtures in May 1964, Secretary o f State 
Rusk judged the United Kingdom “preoccupied with Malaysia” and unable to consider 
anything above the “possibility of providing additional counter-insurgency advisors.” '*’^  
He decided no more assistance would he forthcoming and it was best not to push for 
more commitment at that time.
On August 6, 1964, following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the Wilson Government 
issued a statement supporting the US actions as consistent with the right of self-defense 
and expressed British determination to “assist reducing the international tension that has 
inevitably resulted from these North Vietnamese attacks.”’*’'* Washington mistakenly 
took this message as a sign of London’s changing attitude and lobbied for more 
assistance. Another series of overtures were made to London between August and 
December, but Prime Minister Wilson would go no further than offering to approach the 
Soviet Union about to re-opening the Geneva talks to help bring an end to the escalating 
hostilities. Johnson chose to delay the Prime Minister for as long as possible in an attempt 
to avoid peace talks until Saigon could enter than from a stronger strategic position.’**^
Memorandum Third Country Aid to Vietnam, August 28, 1964, NSF, COF: Vietnam, vol. XVI., box 7, 
Folder 6, doc. 143, LBJL.
Telegram Circular to Embassy From Rusk, May 18, 1964, NSF, COF: Vietnam, box 4, Folder 6, doc. 8, 
LBJL.
Telegram from AmEmbassy London to White House, August 6, 1964, NSF, COF: UK, box 206, vol. 1, 
doc. 63, LBJL.
Memorandum of Third Party Assistance August 28, 1964, NSF, COF: Vietnam, box 7, vol. XVI, doc. 
143, LBJL; Checklist o f Diplomatic Actions to Accompany Proposed Course o f Action, Bundy to the 
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Following the Viet Cong attacks on an American marine hase in Pleiku on Febmary 
6, 1964, Wilson contacted Moscow proposing that the Soviet Union and Great Britain 
work together to reconvene the Geneva conventions before the fighting intensified. The 
Prime Minister received no reply. On Febmary 20, 1965, he urged the Soviets to join 
Britain in inviting the Geneva participants to assess proposals for a new settlement. This 
overture received a response on March 15, 1965 in which the Soviets issued their 
“routine denunciation of the United States and a renewed call for the withdrawal o f all 
American forces and equipment.” The next day the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko arrived in London for prescheduled bilateral talks. In several meetings with 
Prime Minister Wilson and British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, Gromyko refused 
any proposal to reinstitute the Geneva Conference until all air attacks in Vietnam ceased 
and until all parties agreed to involve China.
British attempts to re-open the Geneva Conference may have been futile from the 
beginning. In a memorandum that Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy prepared 
for the President in Febmary 1965, he recommended the United States should resist 
negotiations as long as possible. He pointed out that the pressure to negotiate was coming 
from the United Nations and from individual countries such as the United Kingdom and 
the Soviet Union. He believed that Washington should do everything possible to keep the 
matter out of the United Nations. If Vietnam were brought before the Security Council, 
America would be forced to respond. By contrast, when working through a third country 
proposal such as the British overture, Washington could resist as long as possible by 
“making clear our objectives and our willingness to work out a constmctive solution,” but
Harold Wilson, A Personal Record: The Labour Government 1964-1970 (Boston: Little Brown and 
Company, 1971), 79-86.
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prolonging the actual negotiations by asserting that “the Communist side is simply not 
ready to negotiate on reasonable terms.” Bundy believed any conference resulting from 
the British initiative could he “held off entirely for some weeks” and that if  the United 
States conceded to the pressures for talks, it would still have several weeks to stall while 
the format of the conferences was negotiated.'*” There was also great concern that any 
peace initiative involving neutralization of Vietnam with American withdrawal would 
result in a Communist takeover of the South because Saigon was virtually paralyzed and 
the National Liberation Front (NLF) had gained too much control over the rural areas for 
the weakened South Vietnamese to defend.'*’^
By following Bundy’s suggestions, Johnson gave Wilson the impression that America 
supported his efforts. The Prime Minister was encouraged to approach the Soviets and 
when Council Chairman Alexei Kosygin refused to reply, Wilson’s approach was 
dropped. The lack of positive response from the Soviets and Hanoi allowed the 
Americans to claim that the North Vietnamese were not willing to negotiate. The US 
negotiating strategy was more likely intended to pacify public anti-war sentiments and to 
avoid international pressure to involve the United Nations which might take actions 
contrary to American objectives. This policy placed the British in a precarious situation 
and ultimately caused the Wilson Government to lose international credibility.
While the United States placated the British in their futile attempts at peace 
negotiations, Washington continued to solicit British help on the ground in Vietnam. On 
March 5, 1965, Ambassador David Bruce reported a meeting he had with the Prime
Checklist o f  Diplomatic Actions to Accompany Proposed Course of Action, Bundy to the President, 
February 9, 1965, NSF, COF: Vietnam, box 13, Folder 4, Doc. 224b, LBJL.
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Hill, Inc., 1995), 172-75.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
62
Minister Wilson and British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart in which the two 
expressed the growing concern in the Labour Party over Vietnam. It was the majority 
sentiment that another initiative toward negotiations would strengthen the Wilson 
Government’s resolve to back the U.S. policy both internally and in the public 
perception. They argued that further exploration by the British Government, while 
unlikely to receive a satisfactory response from Hanoi, would improve both governments' 
standings in the international community and alleviate some of the internal pressure 
Wilson was facing.'*’^
On March 23, 1965, Foreign Secretary Stewart visited Washington to discuss 
Vietnam. He first questioned the reported use of napalm and nerve gas in Vietnam by the 
South Vietnamese and Americans and warned its unpopularity could result in the loss of 
world support. The discussion then turned to opening negotiations and the utility of 
making a public statement to the effect that the United States was willing to return to the 
negotiating table.” *’
The American Embassy in London hosted fourteen new Labor MP’s on March 24, 
1965, for a discussion on Vietnam. Led by Eric Heifer, they expressed the hard left-wing 
opinion that the United States had “no business in Asia” and that they felt the use of 
nerve gas and napalm was immoral. Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury Edward 
Short told the Ambassador that an increasing number of Labor MP’s were urging 
dissociation from the United States due to what they perceived as “lack of evidence that
Telegram from Ambassador David Brace to the President, March 5, 1965, NSF, COF: UK, box 207, UK 
Cables vol. Ill, doc. 68, LBJL.
Memorandum o f Conversation Secretary Stewart and Secretary Rusk, March 23, 1965, NSF, COF: UK, 
box 207, UK Memos vol. Ill, doc. 148, LBJL.
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US is willing to negotiate.” Short asserted that Washington should “take a more positive 
attitude on negotiations.'”
The Vietnam War was also a topic of the April 1, 1965, Parliamentary Debates.
Wilson found it surprisingly easy to contain the left-wing anti-war opposition, with only a 
few backbenchers questioning the use o f chemical weapons by the Americans. Most who 
spoke that day expressed support for U.S. defense of Vietnam and were quick to compare 
what the Americans were doing in Vietnam to what the United Kingdom was doing in 
Malaysia. American Embassy officials attributed this pro-American sentiment to 
extensive British press coverage of the bombing of the US embassy in Saigon in late 
March which killed two US personnel.” ^
These collective arguments were representative of majority Labour Party opinion and 
pushed Wilson toward disassociation from the United States. There was, however, an 
opposite influence coming from the Office of Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Affairs staff 
argued for a continued pro-American policy. They believed that the “special relationship” 
should be salvaged at all costs since ties to America provided Britain’s most important 
source of power. Given these conflicting pressures, Wilson decided to propose still 
another peace initiative while denying troops to the Americans. This two-pronged 
strategy would keep the opposition busy. As he confided to Richard Crossman, “My 
strategy is to put the Tories on the defensive and always give them awkward choices.”"^
Telegram from London Embassy to State Department, March 24, 1965, NSF, COF: UK, box 207, UK 
Cables vol. Ill, doc. 48, LBJL.
American Embassy London Report on Parliamentary Debates, April 1, 1965, NSF, COF: UK, box 207, 
UK Cables vol. Ill, doc. 37, LBJL.
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Prime Minister Wilson’s frustration with the conflicting attitudes in Parliament was 
only compounded as his relationship with President Johnson began to deteriorate. As 
early as February 7, 1965 the two argued over Wilson’s refusal to send troops to 
Vietnam. Johnson believed that Wilson had no right to become involved in any peace 
process if he were unwilling to participate in the fight. Wilson, in turn, felt he had no 
choice in not sending troops given his domestic situation and believed that he and the 
government could still he effective mediators if the Americans kept them informed. This 
led to increasing tensions at meetings between Wilson and the President and his cabinet 
members.” '*
This troubled personal relationship provided another incentive for Wilson to publicly 
oppose US actions in Vietnam. Many of Wilson’s contemporaries have argued that he 
wanted to establish himself as a great international statesman, comparable to Winston 
Churchill or Harold MacMillan. They believed that Wilson was more concerned with 
becoming an important partner to the United States than with the peace process. Some 
officials were frustrated with Wilson’s preoccupation with grandeur. Minister of Housing 
Richard Crossman expressed his, “disillusionment with his [Wilson] gimmickry” and his 
belief that the Prime Minister needed to commit to a “real job of work based on a real 
strategy.””  ^Based on Wilson’s own accounts of meetings with President Johnson and 
observations by others, the Prime Minister believed that his abilities and influence were 
greater than they really were.
Sylvia A Ellis, “Lyndon Johnson, Harold Wilson and the Vietnam War: A Not So Special 
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Wilson’s interaction with the far more aggressive Johnson did little to improve his 
personal situation or Britain’s international standing. By openly defying the wishes o f the 
President, Wilson, along with his Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, believed he could 
present an image of a strong and independent leader who was not easily controlled by the 
United States. Wilson recounts several meetings with Washington officials in which his 
and Stewart’s open opposition ostensibly changed the attitudes of key officials. One such 
instance occurred on March 22, 1965, when Foreign Secretary Stewart met with 
Secretary of State Rusk and later with President Johnson. Stewart was sent to argue 
against escalating the war and for negotiations. Wilson claimed in his memoirs, “With his 
firm, persuasive and often underrated authority, he had a marked effect in ... steering 
American thinking away from negative attitudes to negotiations.”” ®
Given President Johnson’s perception of Harold Wilson, Stewart’s influence was 
overstated. LB J was continually upset with the Prime Minister for not assisting in the war 
and showed open disdain for the man on a personal level. Johnson based his sense of 
Wilson as untrustworthy in part on information and opinions furnished by Washington 
officials. The CIA opined that Wilson might be an “untrustworthy” person who was 
committed to the special relationship “based solely on sentiment.””  ^Johnson also had a 
preconceived dislike for British Prime Ministers after a misunderstanding with Prime 
Minister Douglas-Home in 1964. Wilson, himself, expressed concern with Johnson’s 
attitude when recounting a discussion with the President in which he was told that
’ Wilson, A Personal Record. 86.
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Johnson, “would never trust a British Prime Minister again.”"* These opinions did not 
help the two establish a friendly personal relationship and, as Wilson’s actions began to 
conflict with President Johnson’s goals, the President’s opinion of the Prime Minister 
deteriorated further.
Yet with the collapse of the personal relationship between Wilson and Johnson and 
the apparent lack of support for the “special relationship” that these events portrayed, 
there were still many members of the British Government that clung to the idea of a bond 
between the nations. As Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart argued in 1965, “I say we 
have on these occasions expressed differences, but I want to warn you (if it is necessary 
to do so) against the attitude of mind which regards disagreeing with the United States as 
a desirable thing in itself.” Fie feared that the Vietnam situation would break down the 
relationship and he saw that as a detriment to Great Britain’s hope of remaining a world 
power. He believed, “We do recognize them as our friends and our allies, ... I have made 
this point because it is a clearly stated part of our Party policy that we want not merely to 
remain in but to strengthen the Atlantic alliance and I am sure we are right to do that.”'
Even with the strained relationship between the Prime Minister and the President, 
Wilson continued to pursue diplomatic initiatives for peace. At the June 18-20, 1965, 
Commonwealth Conference, Wilson proposed a Commonwealth peace mission 
consisting of four Prime Minister’s who would visit various national capitals- most 
importantly Washington, Moscow, Peking, Hanoi, Saigon, and the three ICC member’s 
capitals- to present opposing views on Vietnam and a proposal for the ending of
118
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hostilities. The objective of the mission was to secure a withdrawal of all foreign military 
from the North and the South, neutralize the area, establish an international peace force 
under the auspices of the Geneva Agreements, and present guidelines for the eventual 
reunification of Vietnam. Wilson’s proposal was ambitious but ultimately never came to 
fruition because of the divergent views of the Commonwealth members on the Vietnam 
War and their support or opposition to American policy.’ ®^ Prime Minister Wilson also 
kept open the line of communication with the Soviets throughout the remainder of 1965 
and again in the spring of 1966 without any response.
Domestic discontent with US actions in Vietnam and London’s policy of support 
reached a peak on June 29, 1966, after the Americans bombed the city of Hanoi and the 
port of Haiphong. Public outcry arose immediately and the Leftist members of the Labour 
party responded by strongly urging Wilson to disassociate the government from the 
United States. In Resolution No. 22 presented by Member of Parliament A. Kitson at the 
1966 Labour Party Conference, leftist members wanted the conference to publicly, 
“condemn American intervention in South-East Asia,” and urged the government to 
announce that it “cannot give any support to unilateral action by any country using 
military force to interfere in the internal politics of other states.” '^' A second proposal. 
Resolution No. 32, urged the conference to, “call upon the Government to dissociate 
itself from American policies and military operations in Vietnam.” The resolution 
explained that, “We say that unless we are seen not to he supporting all the policies and
™ Wilson, A Personal Record. 108-18.
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military operations of America in Vietnam we are inhibited from playing our part as 
mediator for peace in that situation.”*^ ^
The bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong even prompted one of the America’s biggest 
supporters within the Labour Government, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, to speak 
out. At the 1966 Labour Party Conference, Stewart took “the view that while we are and 
are glad to be the friends and allies of the United States we should be prepared, when we 
believe the importance of the issue warrants it, to state differences of opinion frankly and 
cordially as between friends and allies.” While he was not as emphatic that the 
government should distance itself from the United States, it was clear that he too believed 
that the government had no choice but to publicly state its disapproval of the US actions. 
Wilson responded with a statement in Parliament the following day that while he still 
supported America’s general policy in Vietnam, “we should, nevertheless, feel bound to 
re-affirm that we must dissociate ourselves from an action of this kind.” '^ '* Parliament 
and the British populace welcomed Wilson’s condemnation of American actions but 
public protest of the war still expanded. Wilson, still convinced that he could bring the 
United States and Hanoi through the Soviets to the negotiating table, continued to pursue 
diplomatic opportunities when they were presented.
The next opportunity came in February 1967 when he submitted another peace 
proposal to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. In January, Washington had launched Project 
Sunflower, a direct approach to Hanoi through the North Vietnamese embassy in 
Moscow to bring both sides to the negotiating table. Johnson proposed what he called the
Labour Party, Report of the Sixtv-Fifth Annual Conference. 184-85. 
Ibid., 180-81.
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Phase A-Phase B plan in which Washington agreed to stop bombing unconditionally in 
Phase A and then both sides would take mutual steps o f de-escalation in Phase B. When 
the approach through the embassy produced no results, Johnson sent a letter directly to 
President Ho Chi Mihn in which he modified the Phase A-Phase B formula leaving a 
time lag between the bombing halt and the end of North Vietnamese infiltrations.'^^
Prime Minister Wilson entered the talks with Soviet Premier Kosygin on February 6, 
1967, under the reluctant approval of Washington and presented the original Phase A- 
Phase B plan to Moscow without the knowledge that President Johnson had already 
submitted a revised version to Hanoi. After a week of negotiations, Wilson convinced 
Kosygin to relay the original plan to the North Vietnamese. The Soviet Premier realized 
he had been given two differing written offers, one directly from the President o f the 
United States and the other from the uninformed Prime Minister Wilson.'^^ When the 
Johnson administration discovered that both messages had been forwarded, the President 
demanded that Wilson’s proposal be retracted and the Prime Minister’s credibility was 
lost. After the incident, it was discovered that both Wilson and Johnson were to blame 
for the failure of Project Sunflower. Washington had delayed informing London of the 
changes to the Phase A-Phase B plan until after the Prime Minister had presented the 
offer to the Soviets and Prime Minister Wilson had been so eager to bring the Soviets into 
the negotiations that he had neglected to discuss his statements with Washington prior to 
forwarding it to Kosygin. These futile overtures made the British Government look
George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy o f the Vietnam War: The Negotiating volumes o f  the 
Pentagon Papers (Austin: University of Austin Press, 1983) 20-24.
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increasingly ineffective in the international arena and eventually led the Prime Minister to 
surrender his diplomatic agenda.
In the end, the Wilson Government was forced to step away from the peace process, 
disassociate itself from the actions of the United States and accept its position as being 
too weak to affect the peace process. As it worked out, Britain was so far out o f the 
process that they had no input whatsoever when the decisive Paris Peace talks o f 1972- 
1973 finally took place. Britain’s “special relationship” with the United States was not 
permanently damaged but by disassociating itself from American actions in Vietnam, 
London was able to gain entrance into the European Economic Community in 1973 and 
begin a Euro-centric shift in foreign and economic policy that would last until the 1980s.
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CHAPTER 4
CANADA AND THE VIETNAM WAR 
Canada’s relationship with and reliance on the United States differed greatly from its 
Commonwealth partners. Canadian Prime Ministers Lester Pearson and Minister of 
External affairs Paul Martin openly agreed with the American objective of stopping 
communist aggression in South Vietnam but were unable to help militarily in the 
intervention. Although Ottawa had been providing economic and non-combatant aid to 
South Vietnam for nearly two decades, Canada was prohibited from an active military 
role due to its membership in the International Control Commission (ICC). Once 
Washington began its more flags campaign, Canada was not placed under the same 
pressure to commit troops as the other Commonwealth members.
President Johnson was aware of the restriction accompanying Canada’s membership 
in the ICC. Canada was appointed a member of the ICC in 1954 as a part of the Geneva 
Agreements. This role completely prohibited any Canadian combat involvement in 
Vietnam by making the ICC responsible for the implementation of the provisions of the 
agreement. Unlike Britain’s claim that its sponsorship of the Geneva conferences blocked 
its combat involvement, Canada was actually prohibited by international agreement from 
intervening. This relieved Prime Minister Pearson of the personal pressure Johnson
71
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continually exerted on British Prime Minister Wilson and also allowed Ottawa a level of 
independence from Washington in formulating its own Vietnam policy.
This freedom also derived from Canada’s geopolitical security. Sharing a border with 
the United States and being located directly between America and the Eastern borders of 
the Soviet Union made Canada a major security concern for Washington. Knowing that 
an attack on Canada could be the first step toward an attack against the United States and 
that any military maneuvers against the eastern side of the Soviet Union would require 
American use of Canadian air space and territory led Americans to conclude that 
Canadian security was as important as American security. By the early 1960s, Canada 
was a member of the North Atlantic Security Alliance and had agreed to participate in 
Distant Early Warning Line (DEW) under the supervision of the North American Air 
Defense Command (NORAD). DEW was an early tracking and interception air defense 
system created and used by the United States and located completely on Canadian soil. It 
was intended to insure American security against a Soviet air attack, but its operation also 
required securing Canadian airspace. All of this meant that Canada was not in the same 
vulnerable predicament as Australia. While Australia wanted Washington’s help in 
Southeast Asia to increase security in its region, the United States wanted Canadian help 
to secure its own region.
While this geopolitical reality allowed Canada a degree of independence from the 
United States, it did not mean that Canada was completely free of any American pressure 
over Vietnam. Johnson may not have been able to bully Canada for military assistance 
because of the ICC but he could use Canada’s diplomatic relationship with Hanoi to his 
advantage. It became apparent to Washington that Canada was most useful as a
' Annette Baker Fox, The Politics of Atttaction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 75-76.
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negotiating conduit between the United States and Hanoi, and the United States began to 
use the Canadian representatives to relay offers of negotiation to Ho Chi Minh. The 
Canadian representatives were also used to gain valuable information on North 
Vietnamese movements and violations of the Geneva agreements. Canada’s diplomatic 
access to Hanoi was invaluable to the United States, and it was important to use Canada’s 
position without compromising Ottawa’s integrity within the ICC. Any pressure on 
Ottawa to provide combat forces would have jeopardized its relationship with Hanoi.
Canadian ICC Membership 
Canadian utility to the United States began long before that of Australia or Great 
Britain. As part of the Geneva Agreement of 1954, Canada was appointed as one of the 
three members of the International Control Commission. The ICC was an international 
oversight body created at the Geneva Conference to guarantee the French evacuation 
from Vietnam and the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces to their respective sides of the 
seventeenth parallel. The members of the Commission employed inspection teams to 
observe the implementation of the provisions and to investigate any complaints of 
misconduct by either side. If the inspection team could not resolve a complaint, then a 
full complaint would be forwarded to the Commission which made a ruling by majority 
vote and recommended a solution to the dispute. The final duty of the Commission was to 
supervise the nationwide elections scheduled for 1956.'^^
Canada was placed in the ICC to represent Western interests and as a counter weight 
to the Polish membership which represented Soviet and Eastern Bloc interests. India was
Paul Bridle, Behind the Headlines: Canada and the International Commission in Indochina. 1954-1972 
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the third, “neutral” member and the chair of the Commission. Because the Canadian 
member was seen as the Western representative, Washington believed that it could 
employ Ottawa to legitimate its actions in Vietnam. When Washington decided that the 
1956 elections should not be held. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles consulted 
Canadian Minister of External Affairs Lester B. Pearson and they agreed that the 
Canadians would contend that the actions of the Viet Minh and not South Vietnam had 
been responsible.*^^
Throughout the remainder of the 1950s, Canada continued to meet its responsibility 
to the ICC. By far the most American-friendly member of the Commission, Canada tried 
to remain as neutral in its decisions as possible. But Canada’s membership soon became a 
double-edged sword. Through its ICC participation, Ottawa was able to gain valuable 
information on North Vietnamese actions and to function as an advocate for American 
and Vietnamese position. Canada’s diplomatic access to areas in the North also provided 
Washington with information on Hanoi’s activities which the United States would not 
have otherwise had.
To maintain diplomatic integrity in the eyes of the North Vietnamese, Canadian 
delegates were often forced to find in the North’s favor in the investigations. Between 
1954 and 1965, the Canadian delegation supported the South Vietnamese and Americans 
in only 53 percent of its decisions while Poland, the Eastern Bloc representative which 
was not being threatened with loss of access to the South, sided with the North 
Vietnamese in 84 percent of its decisions. This voting record placed a strain on the 
relationship between Washington and Ottawa. Many in Washington wanted Canada to
Edelgard Mahant and Graeme S. Mount, Invisible and Inaudible in Washington: American Policies 
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cite more North Vietnamese infractions of the Geneva Accords and to keep the American 
infractions out of the findings. Canada was unable to help the Americans to the extent 
that Washington wished because, as one Indian delegate explained, the American 
violations were so obvious that the Commission had no choice but acknowledge them 
while the Communist’s infractions were much more subtle. Increasing quantities of U.S. 
material and advisory troops arrived in South Vietnams through the ports in Saigon 
where the ICC delegations to the South were stationed. In contrast. North Vietnamese 
were infiltrating into the South through the jungles and down the Ho Chi Minh Trail 
which were far less accessible to the Commission investigators.*^**
In a June 1962 ICC report, the Commission found that the North had violated the 
Geneva agreements by transporting “armed and unarmed personnel, arms, and munitions 
and other supplies” from the North to the South “with the object of supporting, 
organizing and carrying out hostile activities.” It also found South Vietnam in violation 
for “receiving the increased military aid from the United States” and the “introduction of 
a large number of U.S. Military personnel beyond the stated strength” which amounted to 
a “factual military alliance, which is prohibited under ... the Geneva Agreements.”*^* By 
finding both sides in violation, the ICC showed how its authority over the parties was 
contingent on its ability to placate each side and resulted in diminished access to each 
zone. Canada maintained its diplomatic relationship with Hanoi which proved both useful 
and frustrating to the United States. The Canadian ICC delegation often informed 
Washington and Saigon of the content of discussions at the Commission meetings and 
gave the Americans information and findings that were not included in the ICC Reports.
Mahant, Invisible and Inaudible in Washington. 50-54. 
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This information helped Washington formulate both military strategy and its negotiations 
proposals.
Canada ultimately became disillusioned with the ICC’s lack of any real power to 
control or monitor the actions of the opposing sides. By the spring of 1963 when the 
Pearson Government took office, a majority of Canadian Parliament members were ready 
to resign from the ICC and distance themselves from the unpopular American policy. 
Others in the administration supported the American resolve to stop communist 
insurgents and decided to increase Canadian diplomatie assistance. When serious 
hostilities broke out with U.S. bombing of the North following the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident, the ICC was completely removed from the North and greatly restricted in the 
South since neither of Hanoi nor Saigon could ensure the safety of the ICC 
representatives. Not until 1972 would the ICC again have any real efficacy in 
Vietnam.
Canadian Assistance to the More Flags Campaign 
With the initiation of the more flags campaign. President Johnson and Secretary Rusk 
began to examine potential Canadian usefulness. Secretary Rusk met with Canadian 
Prime Minister Pearson and Minister of External Affairs Paul Martin in late April 1964 
and proposed using Canada’s new ICC Commissioner, Blair Seaborn, to convey 
messages to Hanoi regarding Washington’s intensions and to act as an intermediary in 
negotiations. Rusk intended to use Seaborn to convey America’s “determination to see 
things through” but to stress that Washington “wants no military bases or other footholds 
in South Vietnam or Laos.” Rusk also proposed that Seaborn use his access to determine
Bridle, Behind the Headlines. 17-18.
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how much pressure or backing the Chinese were providing Ho Chi Minh and whether he 
“considers himself over-extended and exposed.”
On May 28, 1964, President Johnson and Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson 
met at the New York Hilton Hotel and discussed the possible Seaborn mission. The 
Prime Minister assured Johnson that Canada “agreed on the importance of sending Mr. 
Seaborn to Vietnam” and was eager “to have a Canadian officer play this important role 
of reporting accurately the purposes of the United States Government and the meaning of 
any actions in which it might be involved.” The President responded that the United 
States was grateful and declared that “the U.S. had no desire to threaten any government 
in the area, and wanted nothing more than the restoration of peace in countries which 
were now under attack from outside.”*
At that same time, the State Department Special Assistant on Vietnam William 
Sullivan and Canadian Minister of External Affairs Martin also met to discuss the 
possible Seaborn Mission and began finalizing the details. They agreed that Seaborn 
“need not agree with or associate his government with the substance of some of the 
messages he would be asked to transmit.”*
The final guidelines for the Seaborn mission were forwarded to the Canadian 
Embassy on May 30, 1964. Seaborn was asked to transmit messages between 
Washington and Hanoi verbatim regardless of his agreement or disagreement with the
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content and was to be assured that the Canadian Government would not have to associate 
itself with the messages. He was directed to observe the North Vietnamese for any signs 
of internal struggles, tensions with the Soviets or China, and for signs of war weariness. 
Most importantly. Seaborn was to relay Washington’s intention to “maintain the 
independence and territorial integrity of South Viet-nam” and to warn that unless Hanoi 
ceased all acts of war within one week of the approach, “the United States will initiate 
action by air and naval means against North Vietnam until Hanoi does agree.” If Hanoi 
agreed, the United States would work to reopen trade with North Vietnam, provide 
economic aid, extend diplomatic recognition and phase out U.S. forces in South Vietnam 
over a one-year period.*^®
In Seaborn’s first mission to Hanoi on June 18, 1964, he met with North Vietnamese 
Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and delivered the American message. Pham “welcomed 
the opening up of the Channel” but also expressed his displeasure with the commando 
raids being conducted by the United States and the South Vietnamese in Laos. Seabom’s 
assessment of Pham Van Dong’s reaction left him cautious but mildly encouraged.
Pham Van Dong then explained Ho Chi Minh’s position to Seaborn. His solution 
required a complete American withdrawal from Indochina, a South Vietnamese 
Government arranged by the people of the South including the National Liberation Front, 
and a reunification of the country without military intervention. The North Vietnamese 
Prime Minister assured Seaborn that the people of Vietnam did not want the war to
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intensify but would fight if required. He emphasized, “it is impossible for you Westerners 
to understand the force of the people’s will to resist and to continue.”'
Washington was disappointed with the North Vietnamese response and began looking 
more closely at the possibility of military intervention. In his July 2,1964, circular 
telegram the President increased the pressure for third country participation by directly 
appealing to the countries for increased contributions.'^^ Canada was also concerned with 
the apparent stalemate resulting from the initial mission. In response to Johnson’s pleas 
for assistance. Department of External Affairs officials recommended to the Prime 
Minister that Ottawa increase its current aid program to Vietnam by examining the 
“shopping list” of supplies needed by the South Vietnamese to see what Canada could 
supply without jeopardizing its ICC neutrality.
While working closely with Seaborn to propose peace negotiations with Hanoi, the 
State Department was also pursuing the more flags campaign. In a June 15, 1964, 
memorandum. Dean Rusk recognized that the Canadians were worried about increasing 
any contributions to Vietnam because of the ICC. He also acknowledged the increasing 
Canadian public opposition to U.S. action in Vietnam.'"*" In a July 10 assessment of third 
country assistance by the State Department, Canadian contributions included a plan for
Telegram from State Department to AmEmbassy in Saigon, July 11, 1964, in Herring, Secret Diplomacy 
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additional aid to the University of Hue and an inereased number of Canadian 
Government grants for Vietnamese students to study in Canada.'""
Discussion of a possible second mission was underway in late July and early August 
when the Gulf of Tonkin incident stiffened the Ameriean resolve. Seaborn arranged a 
meeting with Pham Van Dong on August 13 and was instructed to convey that the 
“Americans were at a complete loss to understand the DRV motive” in the attacks and 
that the “only reasonable hypothesis was that North Vietnam was intent on. . .  provoking 
the United States.” Seaborn was to clarify that the USS Maddox was not associated with 
any attacks on the DRV and that Washington’s response “for the present will be limited 
and fitting.” Further, the American “patience with North Vietnamese aggression is 
growing extremely thin” and the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution re-affirmed 
the determination of the U.S. Government “to continue to oppose firmly.. DRV efforts to 
subvert and conquer South Vietnam and Laos.” Finally, Seaborn was to warn Pham Van 
Dong that “if  the DRV persists in this present course, it can expect to continue to suffer 
the consequences” because the United States possessed the “ways and means of 
measuring the DRV’s participation in, and direct control of, the war on South Vietnam... 
and would be carefully watching the DRV’s response.”'"*^  Following the meeting.
Seaborn notified Washington that Pham Van Dong had an “angry reaction” to this
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catalog of US threats but Seaborn felt the North Vietnamese leader believed the channel 
of eommunication should remain open.'"*^
The Gulf of Tonkin incident elicited concern in Ottawa, but also reinforced Canadian 
resolve to support Washington. Canada decided to increase its non-military aid to South 
Vietnam and also proposed another Seaborn mission. Contending that serious talks with 
Hanoi were not possible under the eireumstanees, the United States resisted Canadian 
advances until mid-Deeember.'"*"* Even then. Seaborn was given no new points to add to 
the prior communication. The main purpose of his visit was to assess if  the DRV had 
changed its position from the previous summer and to reassert America’s determination 
to assist the South Vietnamese.'"*^
Pearson and the Canadian Government were disappointed with Washington’s refusal 
to use the opportunity to push harder for negotiations and became disillusioned with US 
policy as they had with the ineffectiveness of the ICC. This bitterness was eompounded 
after Prime Minister Pearson’s January 1965 trip to LBJ Raneh where President Johnson 
introduced him to the press as Prime Minister Wilson and then entertained the entire 
delegation with tours and dinners all the while avoiding any opportunity to discuss 
Vietnam.
The Canadian leader’s disaffection was also apparent in their ambivalence regarding 
the level of their aid to South Vietnam. By the Deeember 11, 1964, Canada had 
contributed $1.5 million in educational, medical aid commodity assistance to South
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Vietnam. National Security Council Staff member Michael Forrestal deemed Canada a 
“poor candidate for additional signifieant help for political reasons.” Therefore, Ottawa 
should not be solicited again for assistance because of their ICC membership. He also 
warned that Ottawa might withdraw from the ICC and Southeast Asia because “they are 
in a sour mood.”'"*"
Following the initiation of Rolling Thunder bombing campaign in February 1965, 
Prime Minister Pearson came under growing pressure from international sources, such as 
Indian Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri and United Nations Secretary General U 
Thant, to use his influence as a close Washington ally to convince President Johnson that 
force would not yield negotiations. The Prime Minister also received domestic pressure 
from several sources— such as External Affairs Under Secretary Escott Reid, intellectuals 
and students, younger members of the Liberal Party, and even his wife and son— to speak 
out against the bombing. Pearson began to agree and voiced this shifting position in a 
February 10, 1965, speech. He criticized the escalating American involvement indirectly 
by urging the use of quiet diplomacy. He acknowledged North Vietnamese aggression 
against the Saigon, but criticized US involvement in the South where it “seems to have 
found no solid basis of support through a South Vietnam Government of strength and 
popularity.”'"*’
This speech was the first real evidence of Canadian disapproval with the United 
States actions in Vietnam, but it would not be the last. As the use of napalm and nerve 
gas became widely publicized, the Canadian public increased pressure on Ottawa to
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distance itself from the Americans. Pearson incorporated the idea of using a bombing halt 
to encourage Hanoi to come to the negotiating tables in a speech he delivered at Temple 
University on April 2, 1965. While portraying US intervention as being one of honorable 
defense at the request of the South Vietnamese, Pearson made clear that he believed the 
extensive bombing should have had its intended effect of warning the North o f US 
resolve. Therefore, he suggested, “a measured and announced pause in one field of 
military action at the right time might facilitate the development of diplomatic resources 
which cannot easily be applied to the problem under the existing circumstances.” '"** 
President Johnson was outraged by these speeches and made that very clear to the 
Prime Minister the following day at Camp David. After purposely ignoring Pearson for 
over an hour, Johnson led him out to the garden where he berated the Prime Minister for 
undercutting the US position. He was offended that Pearson had not discussed the speech 
with the White House for prior approval and that he had given the speech at an American 
university knowing that the President had been receiving great criticism from the 
universities.*"*" The Prime Minister tried to smooth over the offense in a letter upon his 
return to Ottawa. He expressed Canada’s intention to support American policy in 
Vietnam but admitted that his government was increasingly apprehensive that 
Washington was headed in the wrong direction in Vietnam and he was therefore 
compelled to suggest a possible pause. Pearson stressed that his speech called for only a 
limited pause “at the right time” and that he believed that such an act would strengthen
Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoir o f the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, eds. John A. Munro 
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the President’s position diplomatically.*"" Although the letter was accepted in 
Washington, the relationship between the President and the Prime Minister was never 
mended. As the Americans moved toward a full combat commitment in June, Canadians 
continued to pursue diplomatic alternatives. Two more diplomatic missions would be 
undertaken before it became clear to Ottawa that negotiations were not soon to come.
As America escalated its involvement throughout the summer of 1965, domestic and 
international pressure mounted on Pearson to move Washington toward negotiation. The 
Prime Minister notified Johnson that he was available to quietly pursue negotiations. He 
saw an opportunity during the 1965 Christmas bombing pause. Pearson and Secretary of 
State for External Affairs Paul Martin proposed sending retired Canadian Ambassador to 
China Chester A. Ronning on a mission to Hanoi to promote talks between the 
combatants. Washington reluctantly approved the mission despite the suspicion most 
American officials, such as William Bundy and Dean Rusk, held for Ronning, who was 
openly critical of American Asian policy.*"*
The initial meeting occurred on March 7-11,1966, after complications with travel 
visas to China and Hanoi held up the mission. Ronning met with several North 
Vietnamese officials including foreign minister Nguyen Duy Trinh but gained no 
movement on the North Vietnamese position that American acceptance of the Four Points 
was the only basis for a peaceful settlement. Ronning then met with Pham Van Dong who 
reluctantly indicated that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) would enter into 
some form of preliminary meetings if the United States agreed to cease bombing and 
combat exercises against the North. Pham further added that the North had already
150 Pearson, Mike. 142-43.
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offered this in a January 4, 1966, letter to Washington. President Johnson and Secretary 
Rusk were not enthusiastic about the response. The January letter had indicated that only 
after the Americans agreed to the National Liberation Front’s Four Points, would Hanoi 
agree to negotiations. Rusk feared Hanoi would interpret a bombing halt as US agreement 
to the Four Points and refused to give the Canadians a reply for Hanoi. External Affairs 
Minister Martin persistently urged the United States to respond until Washington agreed 
to a second Ronning mission.
Ronning was sent to Hanoi again on June 14, 1966, with the message that 
Washington was willing to talk without conditions, to de-escalate mutually, or to 
communicate with Hanoi via intermediaries but was not prepared to accept the Four 
Points proposal. He also carried instruction unknown to Washington. External Affairs 
Minister Martin directed Ronning to “advance the process” by requesting Pham Van 
Dong’s interpretation of the third of the Four Points, which stated that South Vietnam’s 
problems should be settled by the people without outside interference, and whether 
further exchanges on this point could be made. Martin believed that the Canadians could 
negotiate a more liberal North Vietnamese stance on this issue as a way to encourage the 
Americans to take a more flexible stance on the Four Points.*"^
The second Ronning mission produced no results. He was told that Pham Van Dong 
was not available and the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh 
expressed only disappointment in the message.*"* The mission also had repercussions in 
Canada. Shortly before Ronning left for Hanoi, Prime Minister Pearson learned that 
Johnson and his advisors had authorized bombing strikes in Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor.
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Pearson and his advisors also discovered that Washington had sent a message through 
Peking of Ronning's upcoming visit and had expressed American willingness to suspend 
the bombing in exchange for a halt in the North’s infiltration of the South as terms for 
negotiations. This message contained far more lenient terms than the message 
Washington sent through Ronning. Canadian official felt that the Americans expected the 
Canadian diplomat would receive a negative response and intended to use it as 
justification to gain public support for the approved bombing escalation.’""*
The rift caused by the Ronning mission was only a symptom of a larger disagreement 
between the two countries over Vietnam. Canadian public support for American policy 
in Vietnam was down to 34 percent by May 1966 and the growing numbers o f American 
draft-resisters crossing the border to Canada were adding to the anti-American sentiment. 
A delegation of faculty members from the University of Toronto’s Victoria College was 
also exciting controversy for the Pearson Government by questioning the Defense 
Production Agreement between the United States and Canada in which Canadian 
produced military supplies were being sold to America and subsequently used in 
Vietnam.
President Johnson decided to visit New Brunswick in August 1966 in an attempt to 
salvage the deteriorating relationship. Prime Minister Pearson and External Affairs 
Minister Martin agreed with the President that the two governments had disagreements 
but would approach the problem of Vietnam together. This agreement calmed the 
tensions for a few months, but by January 1967 the public discontent with Vietnam began
Donaghy, Tolerant Allies. 137-39.
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to rise again and the Pearson Government faced new criticism that the ICC members 
were acting as US informants and not as international civil servants.’""
Canada finally broke with the United States over Vietnam for several reasons.
Domestic opposition to American Vietnam policy and Canadian support for those 
policies threatened the Pearson Government’s electoral prospects. Ottawa disagreed with 
the ongoing American escalation of hostilities because many officials feared that a 
protracted war would undermine American resolve to combat communism in other, more 
important places.’"" Finally, Pearson’s support of American actions in Vietnam and his 
assistance in forwarding Washington’s diplomatic proposals began jeopardizing 
Canadian credibility as a member of the International Control Commission and as an 
independent international diplomat. This contributed to Pearson losing the 1968 election 
and Pierre Elliott Trudeau replacing him as Prime Minister.
Trudeau opposed Canada’s existing foreign policy of “quiet diplomacy” and reliance 
on the “special relationship” with the United States. He began reorganizing the 
Department of External Affairs, reducing Canadian commitments to NATO and the 
Atlantic alliance, and openly questioned the war in Vietnam. The Prime Minister 
encouraged draft evaders from America and publicly urged an end to the war. His 
relationship with the newly elected President Richard M. Nixon suffered greatly because 
of his anti-war attitude and his insistence that Canada extend diplomatic recognition to 
communist China. With the Vietnam war still growing despite of Nixon’s 
“Vietnamization” policy, Trudeau faced public disapproval of Canadian alliance with the
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United States and lost his majority in the 1972 elections. In response, the Canadian 
Parliament under the Prime Minister’s direction passed a resolution against the war in 
January 1973. The Canadian government agreed to serve on the ICSC constituted in 1973 
but would no longer support American actions in Vietnam.'"’
John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies (Athens: 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION
The more flags campaign had little success. By June 1965, when President Lyndon 
Johnson committed full combat forces to Vietnam, the only Commonwealth nations to 
join the Americans were Australia and New Zealand. While the more flags campaign 
garnered greater success with other American allies, such as South Korea and the 
Philippines, the campaign revealed the strained relations between the United States and 
its traditional Commonwealth allies.
By the summer of 1964, Washington faced the inevitability that if the United States 
were going to stave off communist victory in South Vietnam, American troops would 
have to be engaged. The Johnson administration knew that such a policy could have 
negative consequences affecting not only the administration’s popularity, but also its 
ability to pursue its domestic reform agenda. The more flags campaign sought to create 
the impression that Washington’s actions were well supported and much wanted. It was 
never the intent of Johnson or his administration to establish a multilateral coalition in 
which the United States was just one of the participants. Washington meant to control the 
war in Vietnam and only solicited military support for public relations purposes. As the 
more flags campaign foundered and the frustration in the White House grew, the push for 
allies had the opposite effect. The more the administration pushed, the more America’s
89
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traditional allies disapproved military involvement. In the end, rifts between the capitals 
widened and relationships between the leaders disintegrated.
Each Commonwealth country was experiencing a period of readjustment; each faced 
economic, political and social changes that forced re-examinations o f its own 
international relationships. At the same time, they confronted the struggle in Vietnam and 
Washington’s insistence that her allies faithfully support American policy. American’s 
fear of communism and its containment policy directed Washington’s attention to 
Southeast Asia. London’s need to improve its economic position and end post-colonial 
burdens drove Britain away from Southeast Asia. Caught in the middle were Australia, 
whose security relied directly on the security of the region, and Canada, which was 
inescapably entangled in Vietnam through its membership in the ICC.
Like the Johnson administration, most American allies faced internal dissention over 
the war. Britain and Canada experienced public opposition to the war and to the methods 
that the United States used to wage the conflict. As President Johnson well knew, losing 
public favor could adversely affect one’s policy goals and even career. British Prime 
Minister Wilson and Canadian Prime Minister Pearson could ill afford to entangle 
themselves in an unpopular war in a region of little or no significance to their countries. 
Even though the United States was willing to fight in Vietnam out of fear of losing 
another country as had ostensibly happened with China, it did not follow that the 
Commonwealth members should do the same. They had other problems to address, and 
for Canada and the United Kingdom association with American policy was more of a 
hindrance to their agendas then a benefit to their security.
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Great Britain was in the most precarious position over Vietnam. England had the 
largest military capabilities to contribute to South Vietnam, had the most to gain from 
American Cold War policy, and had only a minor diplomatic tie to the conflict which 
could prohibit a military contribution. London was, however, on the verge of economic 
collapse, in great need of re-building economic relationships with European countries that 
opposed the war, and faced growing internal protest against American actions in 
Vietnam. Prime Minister Wilson’s ultimate goal was to preserve Britain’s ties with the 
United States and its standing in the international community while placating the Labour 
Left which believed American policy in Vietnam was wrong and urged the 
Commonwealth to distance itself from the war. Wilson pacified the Left by refusing to 
send troops and attempted to mollify America by acting as a mediator. Wilson’s 
decision to intervene in the peace process may have been only a means of maintaining 
favor with the Johnson administration and a mechanism to reinsert England into détente 
diplomacy by mediating an end to the war. By accomplishing this, England would regain 
its status as a Cold War arbitrator. Not until after 1967 and the failure of Wilson’s 
mediation did the British Government recognize that it could never maintain American 
favor without capitulating to Johnson’s will. The frustration led Britain to publicly 
dissociate itself from American policy and withdraw from the peace process.
The more flags campaign highlighted the already shifting relationship between 
America and Britain. While agreeing to assist diplomatically in an attempt to assuage 
U.S. pressures, London was more concerned with not being too closely associated with 
American policy and thereby alienating the international, especially European,
Chris Wrigley, “Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Harold Wilson and Labour’s Foreign Policy 1964- 
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community. Had the United Kingdom not been applying for membership into the 
European Economic Community, for both its economic and security benefits, there may 
have been a greater willingness to assist the United States in its endeavor. Washington 
continued its war policy without its most significant western allies because, militarily, 
there was no need. What Johnson needed most from the British was public support to 
help quell US domestic opposition rather than any economic or military assistance that 
the smaller nation could provide.
Canada was in the least precarious situation. Its membership in the International 
Control Commission precluded any military involvement in Vietnam. This was very clear 
to the Johnson administration and relieved Ottawa of much of the pressure that other 
nations experienced. Prime Minister Pearson still felt that Canada had to provide some 
support for her neighbor’s actions and did so through diplomatic means. The Seaborn 
mission did help Canada to establish its own diplomatic utility, separate from Britain and 
the Commonwealth. Unfortunately for Washington, whose campaign was designed to 
gain public support for the war, most of the Canadian contributions could not be made 
public. The government did provide substantial economic assistance to South Vietnam 
and agreed to become a member of the International Commission for Supervision and 
Control (ICSC) which was set up to implement the new peace agreement in 1973.
Canada’s experience in Vietnam made little difference in its relationship with the United 
States. The positive results coming from Ottawa’s willingness to transmit messages 
through the ICC were countered by opposition expressed by the populace and many 
members of the government.
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Of the Commonwealth nations, only Australia, along with a token force from New 
Zealand, committed troops to South Vietnam. Theirs was a choice necessitated by 
security needs and was the result of years of encouraging the United States to take a 
greater interest in the region. Washington considered Canberra’s commitment one of the 
more flags campaign’s successes, yet it was Australia which spent far more time 
encouraging the Americans to increase involvement in South Vietnam. Unlike the other 
Commonwealth nations, Australia had a vested interest in seeing the Americans 
committed to the region and was therefore far more likely to respond to the campaign.
Australia’s contribution had little effect on the outcome of the conflict. While its 
troops were quite effective soldiers, Australia only committed three battalions by the end 
of 1966. Thus the Americans and South Vietnamese continued to do the bulk of the 
fighting. Canberra’s involvement also yielded mixed results. By being one of the few 
mid-level powers to support the United States, Australia greatly improved its relationship 
with Washington but in so doing, entangled itself in a an un-winnable situation that led to 
internal political dissent. By the time Australia’s six-year participation ended in 1971, 
four governments had been voted from office and the public support for the war had 
turned to protest.
Ultimately, Vietnam created a closer relationship between Australia and the United 
States only to have the domestic Australian opposition to the war, which developed out of 
that involvement, tear the relationship apart. The willingness of Australia to act in 
conjunction with the United States against the communism did establish a closer 
relationship that would be called upon again in the future. Most importantly, Australia’s 
Vietnam experience showed the ever increasing divide between Canberra and London.
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Where, as a Commonwealth member, Australia had always turned to the United 
Kingdom to ensure its geopolitical security, now it would rely on the United States.
The more flags campaign also exacerbated the President Johnson’s strained 
relationship with the Commonwealth leaders. Johnson took the lack of positive response 
from the British and Canadian Prime Ministers as a personal affront. A great rift 
developed between the President and British Prime Minister Wilson whom Johnson 
believed was untrustworthy and whom he continually confronted over his lack of 
assistance. As early as 1965 the two argued over Wilson’s refusal to send troops to 
Vietnam. Johnson believed that Wilson had no right to become involved in any peace 
process if he were unwilling to participate in the fight. Wilson, in turn, felt he had no 
choice in not sending troops given his domestic situation and believed that he and Britain 
could still be effective mediators if  the Americans kept them in the information loop.
This led to increasing tension at meetings between Wilson and the President.
The relationship between the President and Canadian Prime Minister Pearson also 
suffered under the strain. After the Prime Minister made his April 1965 Temple 
University speech in which he mildly criticized U.S. policy, the President summoned 
Pearson to Camp David where he berated the Prime Minister for not showing proper 
support for American actions. Pearson was less offended by the President’s tirade than 
other leaders. He seemed to understand Johnson’s distress when he said of the President 
following his meeting at Camp David, “he is more worried about US policy in Vietnam
Sylvia A. Ellis, “Lyndon Johnson, Harold Wilson and the Vietnam War: A Not So Special 
Relationship?”, in Twentieth Century Anglo-American Relations, ed. Jonathan Hollowell (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001, 180-96.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
than he is willing to show. His irritation at any indication of lack of full support for his 
policy... really indicate a feeling of insecurity about the situation.” '^ ®
It was this insecurity in the face of increasing international and domestic opposition 
that led the Johnson administration to pursue more flags. The more flags campaign failed. 
The results exposed growing divisions within the Commonwealth and a realignment of 
security alliances between the United States and her traditional allies, but had minimal 
practical results in gaining military assistance for American objectives in Southeast Asia. 
Johnson in effect cast aside any real search for an international policy in Vietnam in favor 
of a unilateral, interventionist approach. With only minimal support from Australia, the 
United States slowly abandoned the policy by mid-1966. Washington chose instead to 
pursue its war policy without a coalition of Commonwealth support and eventually 
received open criticism from all the members, including its only ally, Australia. The 
Vietnam War also contributed to a re-alignment within the Commonwealth itself. Britain 
turned toward Europe, Australia moved closer to their American ally, and Canada chose 
to pursue an independent path. Both US overtures and Commonwealth responses 
illustrated the uncertain and shifting nature of alliance building and its collapse in the 
absence of true mutual security and economic interest.
The failure of the more flags campaign also held consequences for President Johnson. 
The lack of open support that the Johnson administration found in its allies greatly 
troubled the President. The opposition both at home and abroad prompted the Johnson 
not to seek a second term and left the President feeling more isolated. As he told Prime
160 Pearson, Mike. 141.
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Minister Pearson in the spring of 1965, “Fm beginning to feel like a martyr, 
misunderstood and misjudged by friends.” '^'
Pearson, Mike. 141.
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